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There is something missing in interpretive theory. Recent controversies—involving,
for example, the first travel ban and funding for sanctuary cities—demonstrate that
presidential “laws” (executive orders, proclamations, and other directives) raise
important questions of meaning. Yet, while there is a rich literature on statutory
interpretation and a growing one on regulatory interpretation, there is no theory
about how to discern the meaning of presidential directives. Courts, for their part,
have repeatedly assumed that presidential directives should be treated just like
statutes. But that does not seem right: theories of interpretation depend on both
constitutional law and institutional setting. For statutes, the relevant law comes from
Article I and the procedures governing Congress. For presidential directives, the
starting point must be Article II. This Article contends that Article II and the distinct
institutional setting of the presidency point toward textualism. Article II, particularly
the Opinions Clause, gives the President considerable power to structure the process
by which he issues directives. Drawing on various sources—including the author’s
interviews with oﬃcials from the Trump, Obama, and other administrations—this
† Charles E. Tweedy, Jr., Endowed Chairholder of Law and Director, Program in Constitutional
Studies, University of Alabama School of Law. I am grateful to Jack Beermann, Evan Bernick, Aaron
Bruhl, Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Matthew Chou, Evan Criddle, Neal Devins, Heather Elliott, David
Fontana, Abbe Gluck, Jack Goldsmith, Ron Krotoszynski, David Landau, Alli Larsen, Gillian
Metzger, Henry Monaghan, Michael Morley, Victoria Nourse, Anne O’Connell, Jim Pfander,
Daphna Renan, Shalev Roisman, J.B. Ruhl, Mark Seidenfeld, Kate Shaw, Larry Solum, Kevin Stack,
Peter Strauss, Amanda Tyler, and Chris Walker for helpful discussions or comments on earlier drafts.
I thank Jonathan Barsky, Andrew Lowy, Shannon Murphy, Alex Steiger, and Alec Young for
excellent research assistance. This Article was presented at the Advanced Constitutional Law
Colloquium at the Georgetown University Law Center, the University of Florida Levin College of
Law, the University of Alabama School of Law, the Antonin Scalia Law School, and the National
Conference of Constitutional Law Scholars in Tuscon, Arizona. I am grateful for the comments
from participants at those events.

(877)

878

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 168: 877

Article oﬀers a window into that process. Since at least the 1930s, Presidents have
invited agency oﬃcials to draft, negotiate over, and redraft presidential directives.
The final directive signed by the President may not reflect his preferred substantive
policy; instead, Presidents often issue compromise directives that reflect their
subordinates’ recommendations. This Article argues that courts respect that structure,
and hold Presidents accountable for any mistakes, by adhering closely to the text.
Thus, whatever one thinks about honoring the textual compromises that come from
Congress, there are independent and important reasons to hew strictly to the text that
comes from the White House. Notably, this analysis has important implications not
only for interpretive theory but also for broader questions about the constitutional
separation of powers. In an era of ever-expanding presidential power, Presidents have
at times (surprisingly) allowed themselves to be constrained by their own
administration.
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INTRODUCTION
There is something missing in interpretive theory. Scholars have oﬀered
a rich literature on statutory interpretation and a growing one on regulatory
interpretation. But what about the “laws” issued by the President himself—
that is, the assortment of executive orders, proclamations, memoranda, and
other directives? To be sure, commentators recognize that courts may
examine the validity of such directives—that is, whether the President
exceeded either statutory or constitutional authority.1 But recent
controversies—involving the ﬁrst travel ban and funding for sanctuary
cities—demonstrate that presidential directives raise not only questions of
validity but also questions of meaning.2 Yet Justice Antonin Scalia and Bryan
Garner’s treatise Reading Law—which purports to address “all types of legal
instruments” and discusses cases involving the U.S. Constitution, federal
statutes, state statutes, and private contracts—does not so much as mention
presidential directives.3 And although some commentary has recognized that
courts must interpret such documents, none has oﬀered a comprehensive
interpretive theory.4
1 See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 583-89 (1952) (concluding
that the President exceeded his constitutional authority in issuing an executive order directing the
seizure of property). Scholarship has explored the question of statutory authorization for
presidential directives. See Kevin M. Stack, The Statutory President, 90 IOWA L. REV. 539, 545 (2005)
(contending that directives “must be traceable to some identiﬁable” statute); see also Tara L. Branum,
President or King? The Use and Abuse of Executive Orders in Modern-Day America, 28 J. LEGIS. 1, 2, 64,
68 (2002) (asserting that courts often liberally “justify the exercise of presidential power”); Joel L.
Fleishman & Arthur H. Aufses, Law and Orders: The Problem of Presidential Legislation, L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1976, at 1, 5-6, 19-25 (arguing that some executive orders rest on
doubtful claims of broad statutory or constitutional authority). For a recent analysis of how a litigant
might challenge a presidential directive as violating the Constitution or a federal statute, see Lisa
Manheim & Kathryn A. Watts, Reviewing Presidential Orders, 86 U. CHI L. REV. 1743, 1800-23 (2019).
2 See infra Section III.B.
3 See ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF
LEGAL TEXTS 51 (2012).
4 See John E. Noyes, Executive Orders, Presidential Intent, and Private Rights of Action, 59 TEX.
L. REV. 837, 847-78 (1981) (surveying cases in which executive orders have given rise to private rights
of action); Katherine Shaw, Speech, Intent, and the President, 104 CORNELL L. REV. 1337, 1345-92
(2019) (surveying the use of “intent” in constitutional law and other areas and suggesting that while
presidential intent may be relevant to constitutional law and statutory interpretation, on functional
grounds, courts should be wary of relying on intent to interpret presidential directives); Erica
Newland, Note, Executive Orders in Court, 124 YALE L.J. 2026, 2034-37 (2015) (oﬀering an empirical
survey of cases in the D.C. Circuit and Supreme Court and ﬁnding that these courts have failed to
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The federal judiciary, for its part, has regularly grappled with the meaning
of presidential directives for well over a century. Courts have employed a
variety of interpretive methods. But signiﬁcantly, these (otherwise disparate)
decisions have repeatedly reaﬃrmed a common assumption: presidential
directives should be treated just like statutes.5
This Article challenges that assumption. The argument builds on two
(related) premises. First, as many scholars have recognized, much of
interpretive theory is, at bottom, a theory of constitutional law.6 The law that
governs statutory interpretation necessarily derives from the constitutional
provisions that empower and constrain Congress—principally, Article I.
Accordingly, in the statutory interpretation literature, scholars debate the
implications of the bicameralism and presentment requirements of Article I,
Section 7, and the Rules of Proceedings Clause of Article I, Section 5.7 By
contrast, any theory of interpreting presidential directives must build on the
law that governs the President—primarily, Article II.
Second, interpretive theory must also pay close attention to institutional
setting. Congress is governed not only by the rules laid out in the
Constitution but also by the internal rules and procedures that the House of
develop a consistent framework for reviewing executive orders); see also Matthew Chou, Agency
Interpretations of Executive Orders, 71 ADMIN. L. REV. 555, 558-59 (2019) (exploring when courts
should defer to agency interpretations of executive orders); J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Presidential
Exit, 67 DUKE L.J. 1729, 1739 n.42 (2018) (“Legal scholars have, for the most part, not focused on
presidential direct actions.”).
5 See infra Part I; see also, e.g., Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 298 (1944) (“We approach the
construction of [an executive order] as we would approach the construction of legislation in this
ﬁeld.”); De Kay v. United States, 280 F. 465, 472 (1st Cir. 1922) (“In construing the proclamation of
the President the same rule of construction must be applied as in the construction of statutes . . . .”);
United States v. Abu Marzook, 412 F.Supp.2d 913, 922 (N.D. Ill. 2006) (“The Court interprets
Executive Orders in the same manner that it interprets statutes.”).
6 See, e.g., John F. Manning, Constitutional Structure and Statutory Formalism, 66 U. CHI. L. REV.
685, 686 (1999) (emphasizing the importance of “structural constitutional analysis” to “the basic
interpretive commitments of formalism and antiformalism”); Jerry Mashaw, As If Republican
Interpretation, 97 YALE L.J. 1685, 1686 (1988) (“Any theory of statutory interpretation is at base a
theory about constitutional law.”); Victoria Nourse, Misunderstanding Congress: Statutory
Interpretation, the Supermajoritarian Diﬃculty, and the Separation of Powers, 99 GEO. L.J. 1119, 1122
(2011) (contending that theories of statutory interpretation are undergirded by normative theories
about the separation of powers); Jane S. Schacter, Metademocracy: The Changing Structure of
Legitimacy in Statutory Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 593, 593-94 (1995) (describing the
connection between statutory interpretation and democratic theory as “verg[ing] on the canonical”).
The focus on constitutional theory is, of course, not universal. See infra note 65; see also William
Baude & Stephen E. Sachs, The Law of Interpretation, 130 HARV. L. REV. 1079, 1084, 1097-99 (2017)
(arguing that rules of law governing courts’ interpretation of legal instruments are largely unwritten
and found neither “in quasi-constitutional doctrines, [nor] the Constitution’s text”).
7 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7 (describing the roles of Congress and the President in federal
lawmaking); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2 (“Each House may determine the Rules of its
Proceedings . . . .”); see also infra Section I.C.
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Representatives and the Senate have crafted (pursuant to their Article I,
Section 5 authority). Thus, statutory scholars debate whether, and the extent
to which, courts should credit lawmakers’ heavy reliance on legislative
history.8 This debate suggests that the interpretation of presidential directives
should also be attentive to the institutional setting and procedures of the
executive branch. Notably, the process through which presidential directives
are issued is not set forth in the Constitution or any federal statute, nor is it
widely known in the legal literature. Accordingly, this Article oﬀers readers
a window into that process—drawing on both political science research and
the author’s own interviews with key players from the Trump, Obama,
George W. Bush, and other past administrations.9
This Article argues that Article II and the distinct institutional setting
of the presidency point toward textualism. To be sure, one might assume
that because the President is a unitary actor, courts should look to
presidential intent. But such an approach would disregard the complex
process that Presidents have created pursuant to their Article II authority
for presidential lawmaking. Article II, particularly the Opinions Clause,
grants the President considerable discretion to structure the process for
issuing directives.10 Since at least the 1930s, Presidents have used that power
to invite agency officials to draft, negotiate over, and redraft directives.
Notably, the resulting text signed by the President may not reflect his
preferred substantive policy. After the interagency consultation process,
Presidents often opt to “split[] the difference” among agencies.11
See infra footnotes 74–82 and accompanying text.
Naturally, none of the individuals interviewed necessarily accept this Article’s assertions. See,
e.g., Telephone Interview with John Bies, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., Oﬃce of Legal Counsel,
Obama Admin. (May 2, 2018) [hereinafter Bies Interview]; Telephone Interview with Paul Clement,
Solicitor Gen., George W. Bush Admin. (May 3, 2018) [hereinafter Clement Interview]; Telephone
Interview with Rajesh De, Staﬀ Sec’y, Obama Admin. (May 16, 2018) [hereinafter De Interview];
Telephone Interview with Brian Egan, Legal Advisor at Dep’t of State, Deputy White House
Counsel for Nat’l Sec., and Assistant Gen. Counsel, Dep’t of Treasury, Obama Admin. (May 24,
2018) [hereinafter Egan Interview]; Telephone Interview with Chris Fonzone, Deputy Assistant and
Deputy Counsel to President and Legal Advisor to Nat’l Sec. Council, Obama Admin. (May 22,
2018) [hereinafter Fonzone Interview]; Telephone Interview with C. Boyden Gray, White House
Counsel, George H.W. Bush Admin., and Counsel to Vice President George H.W. Bush, Reagan
Admin. (June 27, 2018) [hereinafter Gray Interview]; Telephone Interview with Michael Luttig,
Assistant Attorney Gen., Oﬃce of Legal Counsel, George H.W. Bush Admin. (July 16, 2018)
[hereinafter Luttig Interview]; Interview with Don McGahn, White House Counsel, Trump
Admin., in Williamsburg, Va. (March 23, 2018 & Nov. 19, 2018) [hereinafter McGahn Interview];
Interview with Lee Liberman Otis, Assoc. White House Counsel, George H.W. Bush Admin., in
Washington, D.C. (June 6, 2018) [hereinafter Otis Interview].
10 See infra Section II.A.
11 KENNETH R. MAYER, WITH THE STROKE OF A PEN: EXECUTIVE ORDERS AND
PRESIDENTIAL POWER 61-64 (2001); see also infra Section II.B.
8
9
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Alternatively, after a more truncated process, the President may issue a
directive that turns out (in hindsight) to have been ill-considered. Article II
gives the President the power to make—and holds him accountable for—an
informed or ill-informed decision. I argue that courts can best give effect to
the structure the President has created—with its potential for compromise
and less-than-effective policy—by adhering to the text.
This analysis has important implications for both legal scholarship and
recent litigation. First, this Article oﬀers something that has been missing in
interpretive theory: an approach for presidential instruments. The Article
contends that courts should hew closely to the text of a directive, even when
the text may not ﬁt what the court believes to have been the President’s
primary goal. Second, this Article shows that after agency review, a President
may well issue a compromise or even toothless directive. This issue is of great
importance in recent litigation over funding for sanctuary cities; President
Trump’s directive seems to be so watered down as to be legally ineﬀective at
defunding those jurisdictions.12 This textualist approach also oﬀers a
theoretical justiﬁcation for why—despite the federal government’s assertions
in defending the ﬁrst travel ban—courts should not credit a memo from a
White House oﬃcial “clarifying” a presidential directive after the fact.13
Article II concentrates accountability in the President himself.
Even for those who are not convinced by the textualist method advocated
here, this Article should at a minimum provide a roadmap for future work on
interpreting presidential directives. Although scholars strongly dispute the
proper approach to statutory interpretation, most do seem to agree that
interpretive theory must be guided by what this Article has called
constitutional and institutional concerns. As this Article asserts, for
presidential directives, the starting point must be Article II, not Article I.
Moreover, this Article’s emphasis on institutional setting links up with what
might be called the emerging ﬁeld of nonstatutory interpretation—recent

12
13

See infra subsection III.B.2.
See infra subsection III.B.1.
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work on interpreting regulations,14 popular initiatives,15 and the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure.16
Finally, this Article has implications for broader theories of constitutional
law and presidential power. The Article shows that for nearly a century,
Presidents have (surprisingly) sought out advice from, and often agreed to the
recommendations of, their subordinates, even when issuing seemingly
unilateral directives. That is, presidential directives are less “unilateral” than
one might have thought. The Article thus contributes to the literature on the
“internal separation of powers” within the executive branch—the idea that
the bureaucracy itself may serve (at times) to constrain presidential power.17
At the outset, I oﬀer a few points of clariﬁcation. First, “textualism” is not
self-deﬁning.18 This Article uses the term to mean that judges must abide by
the ordinary meaning of the text of a directive, understood in context. The
relevant context encompasses, at a minimum, the text and structure of the
directive at issue, other directives issued by the same administration (and
likely those from past administrations), as well as linguistic conventions from
legal terms of art, dictionaries, and colloquial speech.19
Second, this Article does not aim to resolve questions about specific
canons of interpretation. It is arguable that some statutory canons may not
properly carry over to the context of presidential directives, or that this

14 See Lars Noah, Divining Regulatory Intent: The Place for a “Legislative History” of Agency Rules,
51 HASTINGS L.J. 255, 260-61 (2000) (prioritizing “pre-promulgation materials” over an agency’s
“post-promulgation views” in deciphering the intent behind a regulation); Jennifer Nou, Regulatory
Textualism, 65 DUKE L.J. 81, 84 (2015) (theorizing that regulatory interpretation should “focus[] on
the public meaning of the rule’s legally binding text”); Kevin M. Stack, Interpreting Regulations, 111
MICH. L. REV. 355, 360-62 (2012) (advocating a “purposive” method because regulations require
“statement[s] of basis and purpose”).
15 See Jane S. Schacter, The Pursuit of “Popular Intent”: Interpretive Dilemmas in Direct Democracy,
105 YALE L.J. 107, 111 (1995) (critiquing judicial attempts to determine the “popular intent” behind
statutes passed through voter initiatives).
16 See Lumen N. Mulligan & Glen Staszewski, Civil Rules Interpretive Theory, 101 MINN. L.
REV. 2167, 2168 (2017) (advocating interpreting the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure through an
administrative law framework).
17 See Neal Kumar Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers: Checking Today’s Most Dangerous Branch
From Within, 115 YALE L.J. 2314, 2318 (2006); see also infra Part IV.
18 See John F. Manning, Textualism and Legislative Intent, 91 VA. L. REV. 419, 420 (2005).
19 Notably, this Article addresses judicial interpretation of presidential directives. Accordingly,
the Article focuses on the subset of presidential directives that reach the courts. Many directives do
not go to court—perhaps because they address national security matters (and are therefore classiﬁed)
or they do not aﬀect private parties in a way that creates an Article III case or controversy. Such
directives will likely be interpreted solely by executive oﬃcials. Much of this Article’s analysis should
inform the way in which executive oﬃcials perform that interpretive task. But nonjudicial
interpretation of presidential directives may also raise distinct issues. For now, I bracket the issue of
nonjudicial interpretation and hope to address it in future work.
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arena calls for adjustments or even different canons.20 Although this Article
does not address those issues, the framework offered here—a focus on
Article II and the institutional setting of the executive branch—should
inform future work.
The analysis proceeds as follows. Part I lays important groundwork,
describing presidential directives and the tendency of courts to treat
directives as statutes. The Part argues that courts have largely overlooked the
very diﬀerent institutional contexts of Congress and the presidency. Parts II
and III oﬀer an Article II-based theory of interpreting presidential directives,
arguing that the constitutional structure and the distinct institutional setting
of the executive branch point toward textualism. Finally, Part IV suggests
that the process for issuing presidential directives points toward some
(perhaps unexpected) constraints on presidential power.
I. PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVES IN COURT: A LACK OF THEORY
Presidential directives have received surprisingly little attention in the
legal academic literature. Accordingly, to frame the discussion, this Part
provides some needed background. The Part then moves to the central point:
federal courts have repeatedly assumed—without analysis—that presidential
directives should be interpreted like statutes. This Article contends, however,
that a theory for presidential directives must rest on Article II, not Article I.
A. Definition and Brief Historical Background
Presidents today issue a variety of directives—labeled as “executive
orders,” “proclamations,” “memoranda,” or simply “directives.”21 Although
some early commentary sought to make sharp distinctions among these
documents,22 more recent commentators have recognized that Presidents
20 For example, Justice Scalia and Bryan Garner argued that the “venerable principle that an
ambiguity should be resolved against the party responsible for drafting the document . . . does not
apply to governmental directives.” SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 3, at 42. That may be sensible for
statutes, but less so for presidential directives—at least when they impact government contractors
or employees. See Cole v. Young, 351 U.S. 536, 556 (1956) (suggesting “[a]ny ambiguities” in an
executive order that required the termination of disloyal employees “should . . . be resolved against
the Government”).
21 PHILLIP J. COOPER, BY ORDER OF THE PRESIDENT: THE USE AND ABUSE OF
EXECUTIVE DIRECT ACTION 16, 172-75, 208-09 (2d ed. 2014); see Stack, supra note 1, at 546-47
(noting that “American law provides no deﬁnition of executive orders” and that there are no “legal
requirements on the types of directives that the president must issue as an executive order”).
22 See, e.g., H. COMM. ON GOV’T OPERATIONS, 85TH CONG., EXECUTIVE ORDERS AND
PROCLAMATIONS: A STUDY OF A USE OF PRESIDENTIAL POWERS 1 (Comm. Print 1957)
(suggesting executive orders are “directed to” executive oﬃcials, while proclamations are aimed at
private conduct).
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often use these devices interchangeably.23 President Trump’s recent directives
illustrate this point. The ﬁrst two versions of the travel ban were “executive
orders,”24 while the third was a “proclamation.”25
As discussed below (in Part II), the label does aﬀect, to some degree, the
procedure through which the directive is created or revised.26 But a President
may seek to fulﬁll the same policy through an executive order, proclamation,
memorandum, or other device. Accordingly, at the outset, this Article deﬁnes
a presidential directive broadly as any directive that requires, authorizes, or
prohibits some action by executive oﬃcials.27
Notably, these directives have a lengthy historical pedigree. Presidents
have issued pronouncements to their subordinates since the days of George
Washington.28 But while those early directives did at times wind up in court,
most nineteenth-century litigation dealt with the validity of the presidential
directive at issue (that is, whether it was consistent with the Constitution or
a federal statute).29 Questions of meaning were, at best, in the background.
My research suggests that the federal judiciary dealt more regularly with
cases involving the meaning of presidential directives beginning in the early
twentieth century.30 That is likely because the number of directives

23 See, e.g., GRAHAM G. DODDS, TAKE UP YOUR PEN: UNILATERAL PRESIDENTIAL
DIRECTIVES IN AMERICAN POLITICS 7 (2013) (describing how government oﬃcials treat executive
orders and proclamations “as being very similar, if not interchangeable”); see also Legal Eﬀectiveness
of a Presidential Directive, as Compared to an Executive Order, 24 Op. O.L.C. 29, 29 (2000)
[hereinafter O.L.C., Legal Eﬀectiveness] (“[T]here is no substantive diﬀerence in the legal
eﬀectiveness of an executive order and [other] presidential directive[s.]”).
24 See Exec. Order No. 13,769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8977 (Jan. 27, 2017) [hereinafter Travel Ban Version
One] (titled “Protecting the Nation From Foreign Terrorist Entry Into the United States”); Exec.
Order No. 13,780, 82 Fed. Reg. 13209 (Mar. 6, 2017) [hereinafter Travel Ban Version Two] (same).
25 See Proclamation No. 9645, 82 Fed. Reg. 45161 (Sept. 24, 2017) [hereinafter Travel Ban
Version Three] (titled “Enhancing Vetting Capabilities and Processes for Detecting Attempted
Entry Into the United States by Terrorists or Other Public-Safety Threats”).
26 The Office of Management and Budget oversees the creation of an executive order or
proclamation, while other White House sections handle other types of directives. See infra
Section II.B.
27 Accord MAYER, supra note 11, at 4 (“Executive orders are . . . presidential directives that
require or authorize some action within the executive branch . . . .”); DODDS, supra note 23, at 10.
28 See DODDS, supra note 23, at 90-119 (providing a historical survey of early presidential
directives, including Washington’s Neutrality Proclamation of April 1793 and Lincoln’s
Emancipation Proclamation).
29 See, e.g., Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170, 177-78 (1804) (concluding that President
John Adams exceeded his statutory authority by ordering the seizure of vessels); see also DODDS,
supra note 23, at 54-85 (discussing nineteenth-century judicial decisions, which focused on the
validity of the directive at issue); infra note 30 and accompanying text (discussing my research).
30 With the help of research assistants, I conducted Westlaw searches and looked at hundreds
of cases. It was clear that the bulk of disputes over meaning arose beginning in the early twentieth
century. The search terms included: adv: TE(“executive order” /s interp! or constru! or mean!); adv:
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skyrocketed around that time, starting with the presidency of Theodore
Roosevelt.31 As political scientists have reported, Roosevelt issued almost as
many directives as all of his predecessors combined.32 The rise in litigation
may also reﬂect the increasing signiﬁcance of these directives.33 Presidents
began to make policy on matters ranging from labor disputes, conservation,34
and civil rights35 to national security36 and war.37
B. Presidential Directives as Statutes?
Over the past century, the federal judiciary has grappled with various
interpretive questions surrounding presidential directives. The questions of
meaning include, for example, what qualiﬁes as an environmental

TE(“president! proclam!” /s interp! or constru! or mean!); adv: TE(“president! memorand!” /s
interp! or constru! or mean!).
31 See DODDS, supra note 23, at 121 (“[Roosevelt] was the ﬁrst president to regularly use
unilateral directives for major policy purposes.”). The greatest spike was during the 1930s and
1940s—the time of the Great Depression and World War II. See id. at 162 (noting that Franklin
Roosevelt issued 3,522 executive orders, “far more than any president before or since”). Presidents
today still issue signiﬁcant directives at a high rate. See WILLIAM G. HOWELL, POWER WITHOUT
PERSUASION: THE POLITICS OF DIRECT PRESIDENTIAL ACTION 83 (2003) (reporting, based on
an empirical study, that the number of signiﬁcant directives increased beginning in the midtwentieth century).
32 See DODDS, supra note 23, at 121 (calculating that Theodore Roosevelt issued 1,081 orders
while in oﬃce, while his predecessors had issued a combined total of 1,262).
33 See HOWELL supra note 31, at 84 (“The rise of significant executive orders reflects the general
growth of presidential power in the modern era.” (citation omitted)); Alexander Bolton & Sharece
Thrower, Legislative Capacity and Executive Unilateralism, 60 AM. J. POL. SCI. 649, 656 (2016) (asserting
that nineteenth-century orders “tended to be more ceremonial and less substantively broad”).
34 See DODDS, supra note 23, at 124-51 (discussing Theodore Roosevelt’s executive orders
pertaining to labor conflicts, the eight-hour government workday, forest reserves, and wildlife refuges).
35 See Exec. Order No. 11,375, 32 Fed. Reg. 14303, 14303 (Oct. 13, 1967) (establishing a directive
to provide for equal employment opportunities for federal employees); Exec. Order No. 11,246,
§ 202, 30 Fed. Reg. 12319, 12320 (Sept. 24, 1965) (barring discrimination and requiring aﬃrmative
action by government contractors on the basis of “race, creed, color, or national origin”); see also
Exec. Order No. 10,925, § 301, 26 Fed. Reg. 1977, 1977 (March 6, 1961) (banning discrimination by
government contractors with respect to “race, creed, color, or national origin”); RUTH P. MORGAN,
THE PRESIDENT AND CIVIL RIGHTS: POLICY-MAKING BY EXECUTIVE ORDER 46-50 (1970)
(discussing Exec. Order No. 10,925 as President Kennedy’s “ﬁrst major civil rights move”).
36 See subsection III.B.2.a (discussing orders issued under the International Emergency
Economic Powers Act blocking transactions with countries that posed threats to national security).
37 See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 9066, 7 Fed. Reg. 1407, 1407 (Feb. 19, 1942) (authorizing the
exclusion of “any person” from designated “military areas”).
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“emergency”;38 which arrangements count as government contracts;39
whether a directive creates a private right of action;40 whether a directive
authorizes “back pay” in government-initiated actions,41 and the meaning of
terms like “banking institution,”42 “transfer,”43 and even “infant.”44 Courts
have employed a variety of methods to interpret these directives. But one
common theme emerges: federal courts have repeatedly asserted that
presidential directives should be treated just like statutes.45
38 See APWU v. Potter, 343 F.3d 619, 624-27 (2d Cir. 2003) (interpreting Exec. Order No.
12,580, § 2(e)(1), 52 Fed. Reg. 2923, 2924 (Jan. 23, 1987), which authorizes the Environmental
Protection Agency to handle “emergency removal actions” and permits other agencies to handle
“removal actions other than emergencies” under the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980).
39 See Crown Cent. Petroleum Corp. v. Kleppe, 424 F. Supp. 744, 746-49 (D. Md. 1976)
(holding that leases for oil and gas rights qualiﬁed as government contracts within the meaning of
Exec. Order No. 11,246, §201, 30 Fed. Reg. 12319, 12319 (Sept. 24, 1965), which prohibits
discrimination and mandates aﬃrmative action by government contractors); see also United States
v. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc., 553 F.2d 459, 463-64 (5th Cir. 1977) (concluding that a public utility
qualiﬁed as a government contractor for purposes of Exec. Order No. 11,246), vacated on other grounds
by 436 U.S. 942 (1978).
40 Most courts have found that presidential directives do not create private rights of action.
See, e.g., Helicopter Ass’n Int’l, Inc. v. FAA, 722 F.3d 430, 439 (D.C. Cir. 2013); Utley v. Varian
Assocs., Inc., 811 F.2d 1279, 1286 (9th Cir. 1987); Indep. Meat Packers Ass’n v. Butz, 526 F.2d 228,
235-36 (8th Cir. 1975); Farkas v. Tex. Instrument, Inc., 375 F.2d 629, 632-33 (5th Cir. 1967).
41 See United States v. Duquesne Light Co., 423 F. Supp. 507, 508-10 (W.D. Pa. 1976) (holding
that Exec. Order No. 11,246, 30 Fed. Reg. 12319 (Sept. 24, 1965), implicitly authorized back pay).
42 See Propper v. Clark, 337 U.S. 472, 480-82 (1949) (holding that an association of musical
composers was a “banking institution” under the deﬁnition in Exec. Order 8785, 6 Fed. Reg. 2897
(June 14, 1941)).
43 See Zittman v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 471, 472-74 (1951) (holding that an attachment levy was
not a “transfer” within the meaning of Exec. Order 8785, 6 Fed. Reg. 2897 (Jun 14, 1941)).
44 See United States v. Best & Co., 86 F.2d 23, 23-24, 28 (C.C.P.A. 1936) (holding that a
presidential proclamation, which placed an extra import duty on “infants’ outerwear,” applied to
wool knit sweaters that were designed for children between the ages of two and six).
45 See, e.g., Ex parte Mitsuye Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 298 (1944) (“We approach the construction
of [an executive order] as we would approach the construction of legislation in this ﬁeld.”); De Kay
v. United States, 280 F. 465, 472 (1st Cir. 1922) (“In construing the proclamation of the President
the same rule of construction must be applied as in the construction of statutes . . . .”); Singh v.
Gantner, 503 F.Supp.2d 592, 595-96 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (“In the construction and interpretation of a
statute or an Executive Order, accepted canons of statutory construction must be applied.”); United
States v. Abu Marzook, 412 F.Supp.2d 913, 922 (N.D. Ill. 2006) (“The Court interprets Executive
Orders in the same manner that it interprets statutes.”); see also Utley, 811 F.2d at 1284-86 (applying
the Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975), test for statutes, as well as “elemental canon[s] of statutory
construction” in concluding that an executive order did not create an implied private right of action)
(internal citations omitted); Utah Ass’n of Ctys. v. Bush, 316 F. Supp. 2d 1172, 1199 (D. Utah 2004)
(“The test used to determine whether a statute has been repealed is also used for an executive
order.”) (quoting Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians v. Minnesota, 861 F.Supp. 784, 829 (D.
Minn. 1994)). Relatedly, lower federal courts have assumed that the same severability rules apply to
statutes and presidential directives. See Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians v. Minnesota, 124
F.3d 904, 917 (8th Cir. 1997) (“The test for whether a valid portion of an otherwise unconstitutional
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An early case vividly illustrates this assumption. One of the most notable
decisions in interpretive history is Holy Trinity Church v. United States, where
the Supreme Court advised that the “spirit” should prevail over the “letter”
of a statute.46 A federal court of appeals in De Kay v. United States extended
this rationale to presidential directives.47
The De Kay case arose out of a rather unusual set of circumstances. A
1916 Supreme Court ruling (known as the “Killits decision”) declared that
federal courts lacked the common law power to suspend criminal
sentences.48 The Killits decision created quite a stir: Lower federal courts
had suspended sentences for decades; an estimated 2000 individuals had
benefited from such grace.49 Would those people now have to be
resentenced and possibly sent to jail? The Supreme Court anticipated these
concerns, suggesting in its decision that a “complete remedy may be
afforded by the exertion of the pardoning power.”50
President Woodrow Wilson soon responded, issuing a proclamation that
granted what some described as an “unprecedented . . . blanket pardon.”51
Wilson “grant[ed] a full amnesty and pardon to all persons under suspended
sentences of United States courts . . . and to all persons, defendants in said courts,
statute can be severed also applies to executive orders.”); In re Reyes, 910 F.2d 611, 613-14 (9th Cir.
1990) (applying the statutory standard to an executive order); see also Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band
of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172, 191 (1999) (assuming, without deciding, that “the severability
standard for statutes also applies to Executive Orders”). I found only two decisions that clearly
questioned the assumption that presidential directives should be treated like statutes. In the ﬁrst,
the court recognized that its own precedents treated executive orders like statutes and followed suit.
See City and Cty. of San Francisco v. Trump, 897 F.3d 1225, 1238 (9th Cir. 2018). In the second, the
court was primarily concerned with the validity of the executive order at issue. See Am. Fed’n of
Gov’t Emps., AFL-CIO v. Reagan, 665 F. Supp. 31, 34 (D.D.C. 1987) (“[T]here are no established
principles of interpretation for Executive Orders . . . .”), rev’d on other grounds, 870 F.2d 723, 724
(D.C. Cir. 1989) (upholding the executive order and not commenting on any interpretive questions).
Both decisions did, at least, acknowledge the need for interpretive principles in this area.
46 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892) (“It is a familiar rule, that a thing may be within the letter of the
statute and yet not within the statute, because not within its spirit, nor within the intention of its
makers.”). In that case, the Court held that the Alien Contract Labor Act of 1885, which by its terms
barred “labor or service of any kind” by “any foreigner,” applied only to “cheap, unskilled labor”;
thus, the Holy Trinity Church could retain the services of an English pastor. See id. at 458-65, 472
(“[T]he intent of Congress was simply to stay the inﬂux of . . . cheap unskilled labor.”).
47 280 F. 465 (1st. Cir. 1922).
48 Ex parte United States (Killits), 242 U.S. 27, 42, 51-53 (1916). The case was associated with
Judge Milton Killits, whose decision was subject to mandamus review. See Ernest Morris, Some
Phases of the Pardoning Power, 12 A.B.A. J. 183, 185 (1926).
49 See Charles L. Chute, A Probation System in the United States Courts, 11 VA. L. REG. 18, 19
(1925) (“Previous to this decision, a great many Federal judges had suspended sentence[s] . . . .”).
50 Ex parte United States, 242 U.S. at 52.
51 See Chute, supra note 49, at 19 (“President Wilson did the unprecedented thing of issuing a
blanket pardon to these men and women. Had he not done so, all . . . would have had to be returned
to court for sentenc[ing].”).
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in cases where pleas of guilty were entered or verdicts of guilty returned prior
to June 15, 1916, and in which no sentences have been imposed.”52
Meanwhile, in April 1915, Henry De Kay and a banking associate were
convicted of bank fraud.53 De Kay was still in the process of challenging his
conviction—and had not yet been sentenced—when President Wilson issued
the “blanket pardon.”54 De Kay argued that the clemency extended to his
case.55 After all, the proclamation expressly applied “to all persons,
defendants in [United States] courts, in cases where . . . verdicts of guilty
[were] returned prior to June 15, 1916, and in which no sentences have been
imposed.”56 De Kay was not sentenced until February 1920.57
The court of appeals announced that “[i]n construing the proclamation of
the President the same rule of construction must be applied as in the
construction of statutes.”58 “Applying the same rule of construction as was
applied in Church of the Holy Trinity,” the court held that, although De Kay’s
case “‘may be within the letter of the statute,’ it is ‘not within its spirit.’”59
The proclamation was “stated in general terms” but “must be restricted to the
defendants” it was meant to beneﬁt: those “whose sentences had been illegally
suspended.”60 In short, De Kay was out of luck.61
In subsequent years, courts continued to assume that presidential directives
should be treated like statutes.62 To be sure, this assumption does not resolve
interpretive disputes. Although the Supreme Court has moved away from Holy
Trinity, the Court has not adopted a single method of statutory interpretation,
much less sought to make that approach precedential.63 The approach to
52 Proclamation on Amnesty and Pardon (June 14, 1917), in 17 A COMPILATION OF THE
MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 8317 (New York, Bureau of National Literature,
1921) (emphasis added).
53 De Kay v. United States, 280 F. 465, 465-66 (1st Cir. 1922).
54 Id. at 471.
55 Id. at 465-66, 471-72.
56 Id. at 473 (internal quotations omitted).
57 See id. at 472 (noting that on February 6, 1920, De Kay was sentenced to a five-year prison
term).
58 Id.
59 Id. at 473 (quoting Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892)).
60 Id.
61 See id. at 473-74.
62 See supra note 45 (collecting cases).
63 See Abbe R. Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation: Methodological
Consensus and the New Modified Textualism, 119 YALE L.J. 1750, 1754, 1757-78 (2010) (“Methodological
stare decisis . . . is generally absent from federal statutory interpretation . . . .”); see also Sydney
Foster, Should Courts Give Stare Decisis Eﬀect to Statutory Interpretation Methodology?, 96 GEO. L.J.
1863, 1870 (2008) (arguing that “as a matter of policy, courts should give extra-strong stare decisis
eﬀect to doctrines of statutory interpretation”). Although the Court pays more attention to the text
than it did in the past, the Court has not formally adopted “textualism.” See John F. Manning, The
New Purposivism, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 113, 115, 130-131.
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statutes is even more “eclectic” in the lower federal courts, which hear the bulk
of interpretive questions surrounding presidential directives.64 But I argue that
this assumption presents not only a practical but also a theoretical challenge.
To the extent one believes that constitutional theory and institutional
considerations should inform interpretive method (as many scholars do),
presidential directives should be treated as distinct instruments. In short,
presidential directives are not statutes.
C. The Relevance of Structure and Institutional Setting:
Lessons from Statutory Debates
As Jerry Mashaw and others have observed, “[a]ny theory of statutory
interpretation is at base a theory about constitutional law.”65 In debates over
statutory interpretation, scholars focus (appropriately enough) on the
constitutional provisions governing Congress—primarily Article I.66
Statutory theorists are also attentive to the subconstitutional rules and
procedures governing Congress (like committee hearings and the Senate
64 As scholars have demonstrated through meticulous empirical studies, lower courts do not
have “a single approach” to statutory interpretation but rather display “intentional eclecticism.” Abbe
R. Gluck & Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation on the Bench: A Survey of Forty-Two Judges on
the Federal Courts of Appeals, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1298, 1302, 1353 (2018); see Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl,
Statutory Interpretation and the Rest of the Iceberg: Divergences Between the Lower Federal Courts and the
Supreme Court, 68 DUKE L.J. 1, 66 (2018) (conﬁrming that “lower courts’ interpretive methods
remain eclectic”). My research suggests that judges today approach presidential directives with a
similar degree of “eclecticism.”
65 Mashaw, supra note 6, at 1686; see also RONALD DWORKIN, JUSTICE FOR HEDGEHOGS 133
(2011) (“[Lawyers interpreting statutes] must decide . . . what division of political authority among
diﬀerent branches of government and civil society is best, all things considered.”). Notably, not all
theorists agree with this point. See Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Interpretation and
Institutions, 101 MICH. L. REV. 885, 909 (2003) (“The Constitution cannot plausibly be read to say
a great deal about . . . statutory interpretation.”). Adrian Vermeule has advocated a version of
textualism based primarily on concerns about the (limited) institutional capacities of the federal
judiciary. See ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY 4-5, 150, 181, 186-87 (2006).
66 To be sure, statutory theories do not focus exclusively on Article I. Some debates over
statutory interpretation emphasize (at least in part) the meaning of the Article III judicial power.
See William N. Eskridge, Jr., All About Words: Early Understandings of the “Judicial Power” in Statutory
Interpretation, 1776–1806, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 990, 993-95, 997, 1087 (2001) (arguing that “the
original materials surrounding Article III’s judicial power assume an eclectic approach to statutory
interpretation, open to understanding the letter of a statute in pursuance of the spirit of the law and
in light of fundamental values”); John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 6-8 (2001) (arguing that the “evidence of the original understanding of ‘the
judicial Power’ in America is mixed, but ultimately it does not support the equity of the statute,”
that is, the idea that “the judicial power ‘to say what the law is’ originally encompassed an inherent
equitable power to reshape statutes without regard to legislative intent”). Ryan Doerﬂer has
advocated a “‘conversation’ model of interpretation” that draws on due process principles of fair
notice. See Ryan D. Doerﬂer, Who Cares How Congress Really Works?, 66 DUKE L.J. 979, 1032-34,
1042-43 (2017).
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ﬁlibuster). We can see this point vividly in recent debates over textualism and
the use of legislative history.
Signiﬁcantly, these statutory debates reﬂect an important (if at times
implicit) assumption underlying interpretive theory: the process for creating
a document tells us a good deal about the nature of that document and should
thus inform interpretive method. As I argue below, this assumption
underscores the importance of looking at the distinct institutional setting of
presidential directives.
Notably, statutory interpretive theory has long been based on
assumptions about the legislative process. For example, legal process
purposivism urged interpreters to assume that “the legislature was made up
of reasonable persons pursuing reasonable purposes reasonably.”67 Under
this approach, interpreters should discern the primary purpose underlying
a statute and do their best to carry out that purpose in individual cases.68
Beginning in the 1980s, however, legal scholars (influenced by public choice
theory) built important interpretive theories based on a less rosy picture of
the lawmaking process.69
Modern statutory textualism arose out of these interpretive debates.70
Statutory textualists view the legislative process as a means to protect the
interests of political minorities. As textualism’s leading defender John
Manning has emphasized, the bicameralism and presentment process of
Article I, Section 7, creates a supermajority requirement for every piece of
legislation.71 These procedures thus also—especially when supplemented by
speciﬁc rules like the ﬁlibuster and committee gatekeeping—grant “political
minorities extraordinary power to block legislation or insist upon
67 HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS 1378 (William N.
Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., Foundation Press 1994) (1958).
68 See id. at 1374 (advising that a court should “[i]nterpret the words of the statute immediately
in question so as to carry out the purpose as best it can,” although a court ought never to “give the
words [of the statute] . . . a meaning they will not bear”).
69 See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1479,
1533 (1987) (“A model of dynamic statutory interpretation . . . would help to ameliorate some of the
biases attendant to the legislative process.”); Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding
Legislation Through Statutory Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223, 226
(1986) (noting that “traditional methods of statutory interpretation” can “encourage[] passage of
public-regarding legislation and impede[] passage of interest group bargains”).
70 Notably, early textualists drew heavily on public choice theory. See John F. Manning, SecondGeneration Textualism, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1287, 1289-90 (2010) (discussing this history and arguing
that textualists gradually moved away from such a pessimistic vision of congressional lawmaking).
71 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7; Manning, supra note 66, at 74-75. Statutory textualism has been
most forcefully defended by John Manning. But earlier theories also emphasized the Article I
lawmaking process. See ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 25 (1997); Frank H.
Easterbrook, Statutes’ Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 539 (1983) (“Under article I . . . support is
not enough . . . . If the support cannot be transmuted into an enrolled bill, nothing happens.”).
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compromise as the price of assent.”72 Statutory textualists argue that judges
respect the “procedural rights” of political minorities by adhering to the
speciﬁc provisions of the text.73
Textualists’ assumptions about the legislative process also inform their view
of legislative history. For example, textualists worry that legislators might
manipulate the legislative record—intentionally inserting something that they
could not convince their colleagues to enact into law.74 At a minimum,
textualists suggest, committee reports and floor statements are likely to be
unreliable evidence of the statutory deal.75 Accordingly, reliance on legislative
history could undermine the protections for political minorities.76
Recently, scholars and jurists have challenged modern statutory
textualism with competing theories of Article I and the lawmaking process.77
In a nutshell, this commentary suggests that textualists “misunderstand

72 John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists from Purposivists?, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 70, 77
(2006) [hereinafter Manning, What Divides?]; see also Manning, supra note 70, at 1314 (“The
legislative procedures adopted by each House . . . accentuate” the protections for political
minorities).
73 See Manning, What Divides?, supra note 72, at 77 (“[T]extualists believe that adjusting a
statute’s semantic detail unacceptably risks diluting that crucial procedural right.”). Proposed
legislation may be subject to a Senate ﬁlibuster. Under Rule 22, a cloture motion to end debate on
the measure requires three-ﬁfths of the Senate (sixty votes). See C. Lawrence Evans, Politics of
Congressional Reform, in THE LEGISLATIVE BRANCH 490, 510 (Paul J. Quirk & Sarah A. Binder
eds., 2005). For a discussion of the role of committees as gatekeepers, see John R. Boyce & Diane P.
Bischak, The Role of Political Parties in the Organization of Congress, 18 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 1, 1-3
(2002) (discussing how legislation may get blocked by congressional committees).
74 See SCALIA, supra note 71, at 34 (“[T]he more courts have relied upon legislative history, the
less worthy of reliance it has become.”); Frank H. Easterbrook, Text, History, and Structure in Statutory
Interpretation, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 61, 61 (1994) (“[Legislative history is] slanted, drafted by
the staﬀ and perhaps by private interest groups.”).
75 See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 3, at 376; Caleb Nelson, What Is Textualism?, 91 VA. L.
REV. 347, 364-66 (2005).
76 See John F. Manning, Textualism as a Nondelegation Doctrine, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 673, 675,
719 (1997) (allowing Congress to specify details in the legislative history “threat[ens] . . . the
constitutional safeguards of bicameralism and presentment”). Notably, textualists do not foreclose
all reliance on legislative history. See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 3, at 382 (recognizing that
courts might look to legislative history to determine the meaning of a technical term); John F.
Manning, Why Does Congress Vote on Some Texts but Not Others?, 51 TULSA L. REV. 559, 570-71 (2016)
(same).
77 Notably, a number of scholars have powerfully responded to the constitutional and
institutional assumptions of modern textualism. See, e.g., Jonathan T. Molot, The Rise and Fall of
Textualism, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 56-59 (2006) (arguing that textualists focus too much on “the
constitutionally prescribed lawmaking procedures” at the expense of other separation of powers
principles, including the judiciary’s role in blocking “unwise or unjust government action”); see also
Jonathan R. Siegel, The Inexorable Radicalization of Textualism, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 117, 120 (2009)
(arguing that textualism has a tendency to become “progressively more radical and, therefore, less
workable” over time). The discussion in this Section does not aim to be comprehensive.
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Congress.”78 According to these commentators, interpreters can often best
discern what lawmakers believed they were doing (including any
compromises that they reached) by looking to sources outside the text. Thus,
while textualists emphasize Article I, Section 7, Judge Robert Katzmann and
Victoria Nourse point to Article I, Section 5, which grants each house the
power to craft “the Rules of its Proceedings.”79 Each house has exercised that
power to delegate matters—such as the drafting of legislation—to
committees, which then prepare reports for the entire body.80 Some empirical
work suggests that “members [of Congress] are more likely to vote . . . based
on a reading of the legislative history than on a reading of the statute itself.”81
In other words, legislative history may very well be the best evidence of the
statutory deal. Accordingly, as Abbe Gluck and Lisa Bressman argue, “[i]f
one were to construct a theory of interpretation based on how members
themselves engage in the process of statutory creation, a text-based theory is
the last theory one would construct.”82
This Article does not aim to resolve which theorists have the better
argument as to statutory interpretation. Instead, I highlight these debates for
two reasons. First, they underscore the extent to which interpretive theory
depends on both constitutional structure and institutional setting. Second,
they show that, for statutes, the emphasis is—as it should be—on the
provisions and procedures governing Congress. This theoretical debate thus
suggests that any theory for presidential directives should focus on the
constitutional provisions and procedures governing the President.
78 I borrow this phrase from Victoria Nourse’s illuminating work on statutory interpretation.
E.g., Nourse, supra note 6, at 1136. Notably, Nourse believes that many current theories—not simply
textualism—misunderstand Congress. She urges all interpreters to learn more about congressional
procedure. See VICTORIA NOURSE, MISREADING LAW, MISREADING DEMOCRACY 7, 8-9, 15, 17,
64-95 (2016).
79 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2.
80 See ROBERT A. KATZMANN, JUDGING STATUTES 9-13, 48 (2014) (“Congress intends that
its work should be understood through its established institutional processes and practices”);
NOURSE, supra note 78, at 12, 161-81 (“Article I, section 5, the Rules of Proceedings Clause, supports
the constitutionality of legislative evidence.”)
81 Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside—An
Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part I, 65 STAN. L. REV. 901,
905-06, 968 (2013) (drawing on a survey of 137 congressional staﬀers responsible for drafting
legislation). This work built on the pioneering study of Victoria Nourse and Jane Schacter, who
interviewed sixteen staﬀers on the Senate Judiciary Committee. Victoria F. Nourse & Jane S.
Schacter, The Politics of Legislative Drafting: A Congressional Case Study, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575, 576-79
(2002). One limitation of these studies is that the authors talked to staﬀers rather than members of
Congress. Id. at 579; see also John F. Manning, Inside Congress’s Mind, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1911, 1936
n.151 (2015) (questioning Gluck and Bressman’s choice to interview staﬀers when they are not the
ones with “the power to enact legislation”).
82 Gluck & Bressman, supra note 81, at 969.
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II. AN ARTICLE II-BASED THEORY
The Constitution does not mention, much less spell out a procedure for
creating, presidential directives. Nor does any federal statute prescribe an
approach; the Supreme Court has held that the Administrative Procedure
Act does not apply to the President.83 But I argue that Article II,
particularly the Opinions Clause, gives the President considerable
discretion to structure his decisionmaking process. Since at least the 1930s,
Presidents have used that power to invite executive officials to draft,
negotiate over, and redraft directives.
This interagency consultation process has important implications for
interpreting presidential directives. Although the President alone is
responsible for the ﬁnal decision, many directives do not reﬂect his preferred
substantive policy. The President may opt, after consultation, to split the
diﬀerence among agencies. I argue (in Part III) that courts can best give eﬀect
to the structure the President has created—with its possibility for
compromise and less-than-eﬀective directives—by hewing closely to the text.
A. The Opinions Clause and Presidential Decisionmaking
One assumption of interpretive theory is that we can learn a great deal
about the nature of a document—and thus the proper approach to
interpreting that document—by understanding the process by which it is
created.84 Although neither the Constitution nor any federal statute
prescribes a process for crafting presidential directives, I argue that a rarelyemphasized provision of Article II empowers the President to institute such
a procedure: the Opinions Clause. The Clause provides that the President
83 See Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 796, 800-01 (1992) (holding that “textual silence
is not enough to subject the President to the provisions of the APA”); see also Dalton v. Specter, 511
U.S. 462, 476 (1994) (holding that “[t]he actions of the President cannot be reviewed under the APA
because the President is not an ‘agency’ under” the APA). Although Franklin focused on arbitrary
and capricious review, courts and commentators have found or assumed (reasonably enough) that
presidential directives are exempt from the procedural requirements as well. See Kevin M. Stack,
The President’s Statutory Powers to Administer the Laws, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 263, 318 (2006)
[hereinafter Stack, The President’s Statutory Powers] (noting that while “executive agencies must
comply with the APA’s procedural requirements,” the President need not do so); accord Adam J.
White, Executive Orders as Lawful Limits on Agency Policymaking Discretion, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1569, 1569 (2018). Indeed, this “procedural exemption” may be the most important implication, given
that plaintiﬀs can challenge many presidential directives by suing the enforcement oﬃcial under the
APA. See, e.g., Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2403 (2018) (permitting, albeit without discussion
of the plaintiﬀs’ cause of action, a suit “challeng[ing] the application of [the] entry restrictions” in
the third travel ban); Kevin M. Stack, The Reviewability of the President’s Statutory Powers, 62 VAND.
L. REV. 1171, 1194 (2009) (establishing that plaintiﬀs can “in almost all cases” sue “the subordinate
federal oﬃcial who acts upon the President’s directive”).
84 See supra Section I.C (discussing statutory debates).
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“may require the Opinion, in writing, of the principal Oﬃcer in each of the
executive Departments, upon any Subject relating to the Duties of their
respective Oﬃces.”85
As background, I oﬀer a brief overview of the literature on the Opinions
Clause. To the extent scholars have discussed this provision, they have often
focused on what the Clause says about other parts of Article II. Some scholars
argue that the Opinions Clause undermines a central tenet of unitary
executive theory.86 Unitarians assert that, by “vest[ing]” the “executive
Power” in the President, Article II grants him control over all discretionary
executive action, free from congressional interference.87 Skeptics respond
that if the Vesting Clause were that broad, the Opinions Clause would be
superﬂuous; a President with unlimited authority over the executive branch
could presumably “require the Opinion, in writing” of his subordinates.88
A few scholars have identiﬁed a more aﬃrmative function for the
Opinions Clause. At least if one accepts that Congress has some power to
structure the executive branch, the Opinions Clause places an important
constraint on that power.89 Peter Strauss and Cass Sunstein have suggested
that the Opinions Clause ensures that the President may “consult with and
85 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1; see also Akhil Reed Amar, Some Opinions on the Opinion Clause,
82 VA. L. REV. 647, 647 (1996) (describing the provision as “one of the least discussed but most
intriguing clauses of the United States Constitution”).
86 See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 33 (1994) (arguing that to read the Opinions Clause as “something more than a
redundancy,” one must assume “a vastly narrower conception” of presidential power than unitary
executive theory); John F. Manning, Separation of Powers as Ordinary Interpretation, 124 HARV. L.
REV. 1939, 2035 (2011) (discussing how the Opinions Clause casts doubt on the notion that “Article
II’s Vesting Clause confers illimitable presidential removal power”).
87 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1 (“The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United
States of America.”); see Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural Constitution: Unitary
Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1153, 1165 (1992) (“Unitary executive
theorists . . . . conclude that the President alone possesses all of the executive power.”).
88 See supra note 86. Unitarians have oﬀered answers to this challenge but have also
acknowledged that the Opinions Clause may well be redundant. See Steven G. Calabresi &
Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power to Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541, 585 (1994)
(suggesting that the Clause may prevent the President from demanding an opinion on “personal
legal problems”); Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, The Jeﬀersonian Treaty Clause, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV.
1, 30-31 (arguing that the Clause is redundant but still important because it deters Congress from
passing a statute directing oﬃcials to report to Congress, rather than the President). In recent work,
Sai Prakash has argued that the inclusion of the Opinions Clause served a political function by
reassuring early Americans, who were accustomed to executives with “councils,” that “the president
would not lack for advice.” SAIKRISHNA BANGALORE PRAKASH, IMPERIAL FROM THE
BEGINNING: THE CONSTITUTION OF THE ORIGINAL EXECUTIVE 194 (2015); see also infra notes
106–109 and accompanying text (discussing those early councils).
89 Akhil Amar has oﬀered an account that would be consistent with many views of Article II.
He suggests that the Opinions Clause prohibits the President from “requir[ing]” opinions from
other branches—most notably, the judiciary. See Amar, supra note 85, at 655-56.
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demand answers” from agency oﬃcials, so that he can evaluate their actions.90
Under this view, the Clause provides a crucial mechanism for the President
to oversee lower-level oﬃcials in both the executive and the independent
agencies, without interference from Congress.91
90 See Neil Thomas Proto, The Opinion Clause and Presidential Decision-Making, 44 MO. L. REV.
185, 201 (1979) (“[T]he Opinion Clause is an aﬃrmative power” that ensures the President may
“gather[] the information . . . necessary to control and direct the energy and resources of the
executive branch.”); Peter L. Strauss & Cass R. Sunstein, The Role of the President and OMB in
Informal Rulemaking, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 181, 197, 200 (1986) (noting that the Opinions Clause grants
the President a “procedural” power to “control and supervise” oﬃcials, without congressional
interference); see also Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Cooperative Federalism, The New Formalism, and the
Separation of Powers Revisited: Free Enterprise Fund and the Problem of Presidential Oversight of StateGovernment Oﬃcers Enforcing Federal Law, 61 DUKE L.J. 1599, 1642 (2012) (“[T]he Opinions Clause
supports the claim that the president must enjoy the ability to oversee the execution of federal
law . . . .”). Notably, as Professor Strauss has underscored in other work, the Opinions Clause allows
the President to get information from—and thereby check up on—oﬃcials; the Clause does not
indicate that the President may instruct federal oﬃcials to disregard a statutory duty. See Peter L.
Strauss, Foreword: Overseer, or “The Decider”? The President in Administrative Law, 75 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 696, 727 (2007) (emphasizing that the Opinions Clause does not authorize the President to
“keep . . . oﬃcers from performing any such duty as the Congress may statutorily have assigned to
them (and not to him)”). Relatedly, scholars have debated whether statutes that confer power on
agency oﬃcials should be construed to permit the President to direct the actions of those oﬃcials.
Compare Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2251 (2001) (arguing that
the President should presumptively have such authority over oﬃcials in executive agencies), with
Stack, The President’s Statutory Powers, supra note 83, at 267 (contending that “the President has
directive authority . . . only when the statute expressly grants power to the President in name”).
This Article takes no position on that question of statutory interpretation.
91 See Strauss & Sunstein, supra note 90, at 200 (arguing that this procedural supervisory power
extends to both executive and independent agencies). A federal agency is typically considered
“independent” if the President cannot remove the agency’s leaders at will. See Cass R. Sunstein,
Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 HARV. L. REV. 421, 492 (1987). It seems to be an open
question whether the Opinions Clause permits the President to demand opinions from the leaders
of independent agencies. In separate (and later) work, Cass Sunstein along with Larry Lessig
suggested (tentatively) that the Opinions Clause may not apply to “nonexecutive” agencies. See
Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 86, at 35-36; cf. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1 (“[The President] may
require the Opinion . . . of the principal Oﬃcer in each of the executive Departments”) (emphasis
added). But as Martin Flaherty has pointed out, that argument relies on an assumption that
individuals at the Founding made a sharp distinction between “executive” and “nonexecutive”
departments. Flaherty persuasively argues that is unlikely. See Martin S. Flaherty, The Most
Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE L.J. 1725, 1796 (1996); see also PRAKASH, supra note 88, at 200 (arguing
the term “executive departments” simply underscored that the President could not demand opinions
from the Chief Justice—as had earlier drafts (emphasis added)). Accordingly, I agree with other
scholars that the Clause is most reasonably read to apply to both types of agencies. See MICHAEL
W. MCCONNELL, THE PRESIDENT WHO WOULD NOT BE KING (forthcoming Nov. 2020)
(manuscript at 63-64, 193) (on ﬁle with author) (stating that the Opinions Clause applies to both
the independent and the executive agencies and limits Congress’s power to make top oﬃcials
“independent of presidential oversight”); J. Gregory Sidak, The Recommendation Clause, 77 GEO. L.J.
2079, 2134 & n.239 (1989) (noting that Presidents may in eﬀect delegate to and order independent
agencies as well as executive agencies); Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government:
Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573, 646 (1984) (citing as supporting
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But I argue that the Opinions Clause does not simply provide the
President with a tool to check up on his subordinates. The provision also
invites the President to seek advice and counsel—an “Opinion, in writing”—
from oﬃcials, so that he can make a more informed decision.92 Indeed, the
text of the Clause suggests that the information-gathering function may be
its primary purpose.93 The provision authorizes the President to ask
“principal Oﬃcer[s]” for advice about “any Subject relating to the Duties of
their respective Oﬃces”—that is, the precise issues on which the oﬃcials will
have greater expertise.94
Other structural features of Article II provide some assurance that the
President will listen to such advice. The Appointments Clause empowers the
President to nominate those “principal Oﬃcers.”95 Although the Senate must
conﬁrm each nominee, “they cannot themselves choose—they can only ratify
or reject the choice of the President,” leaving him with the power to select an
alternative.96 One presumes that most Presidents select individuals who (the
Presidents believe) will oﬀer cogent and helpful advice. Along the same lines,
to the extent that the President genuinely invites candor, his removal power
will encourage a subordinate oﬃcial to provide a candid opinion.97
evidence that both Presidents and independent agencies have understood the Opinions Clause to
cover independent agencies); see also Kagan, supra note 90, at 2324 (noting the scholarly consensus
that the President may exercise a “‘procedural’ supervisory authority” over both types of agencies,
and that the Opinions Clause may bar congressional interference).
92 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. A few scholars have recognized that the Clause serves this
function, albeit with very little discussion. See, e.g., Harvey C. Mansﬁeld, Reorganizing the Federal
Executive Branch: The Limits of Institutionalization, 35 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 461, 463 (1970)
(noting that one plausible purpose of the Clause was to “provide [the President] with informed
advice”); see also PRAKASH, supra note 88, at 194 (noting the Clause enables the President to “demand
opinions related to facts, law, and public policy so that he may make informed decisions about law
execution, foreign aﬀairs, and the military”).
93 The origins of the Opinions Clause are “somewhat obscure.” Lessig & Sunstein, supra note
86, at 33; see also Gary Lawson, A Truism with Attitude: The Tenth Amendment in Constitutional Context,
83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 469, 485 (2008) (describing the provision as “one of the seemingly
strangest clauses in the original Constitution”). For a brief discussion of the history, see infra notes
106–109 and accompanying text.
94 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. Of course, as Akhil Amar has asserted, it seems likely that
the President has discretion to determine which subjects relate to the duties of a given oﬃcer. See
AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION 326 (2012) (noting that the
President may determine what is “so closely ‘relat[ed] to’ a given department head’s oﬃcial portfolio
as to warrant a formal opinion”).
95 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl.2 (“[The President] shall nominate, and by and with the
Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint . . . Oﬃcers of the United States . . . .”).
96 THE FEDERALIST NO. 66, at 405 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
(noting that the Senate “may defeat one choice of the Executive” but “could not be sure, if they
withheld their assent, that the subsequent nomination would fall upon their own favorite”).
97 See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 176 (1926) (asserting that the President must have
“unrestricted power” to remove federal oﬃcials); see also Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, 295
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Article II thus gives the President an important tool to learn from
officials before he issues a directive—to invite them to help him ensure the
faithful execution of the laws.98 I argue that Presidents have exercised this
power in structuring the decisionmaking process for presidential directives.
As described in the next Section, Presidents have sought out considerable
input from agency officials prior to issuing presidential directives. Agency
officials draft, negotiate over, and redraft the text of a given directive—
debating (and often disagreeing over) not only the best policy but also the
means of effectuating that policy. In this way, Presidents gather
information—advice on both whether to issue a directive and precisely what
any such directive should say.
One might reasonably ask whether the Opinions Clause is a necessary
source of power. That is, couldn’t the President ask for advice, absent this
provision? The answer depends in part on one’s background assumptions
about Article II. For unitary executive theorists, the Opinions Clause is
unnecessary. The President’s background “executive Power” would enable
him to ask for opinions, absent interference from Congress.99
But for those with a less expansive view of presidential power, the
Opinions Clause serves an important function—in two diﬀerent respects.
First, the Clause ensures that the President may seek advice from
subordinates. That is, the provision places some constraint on Congress’s
power to interfere with that information-gathering function. (The Clause
thus provides some support for the President’s exemption from the
procedural requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act.100)
Second, the Opinions Clause makes clear that the President has no duty
to engage in such consultation. The Clause, after all, states that he “may
require” the written opinion of agency oﬃcials.101 Accordingly, the President
may also opt not to seek advice. In this way, the Opinions Clause diﬀers from
U.S. 602, 629, 631-32 (1935) (upholding “for cause” removal provisions for oﬃcials in independent
agencies). If the President did not genuinely invite candor, of course, the oﬃcial might worry about
losing her job if she oﬀered an “Opinion” that conﬂicted with the President’s preferred position.
But under the analysis here, that would be akin to a presidential decision not to seek out advice—a
power that the President has under the Opinions Clause.
98 Cf. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 (“[The President] shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully
executed . . . .”).
99 See supra notes 87–88 and accompanying text.
100 To the extent that Congress imposed a procedural scheme, that would arguably violate the
President’s power to structure the manner through which he seeks out information from
subordinates. Cf. Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 800-01 (1992) (establishing that absent
“an express statement by Congress” the Court would not construe the APA to apply to the
President); supra note 83. This Article does not, however, aim to resolve whether Congress could
impose some kind of procedural scheme.
101 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1 (emphasis added).
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the Take Care Clause, which provides that the President “shall take Care that
the Laws be faithfully executed.”102 Although scholars debate whether the
Take Care Clause imposes duties on the President,103 I assume for present
purposes that the Clause does impose certain obligations. Even if one makes
that assumption,104 the Opinions Clause clariﬁes that the President has an
important choice of means in carrying out such duties: The President may,
but need not, seek out advice from his subordinates in determining how to
execute the laws.
The Constitution thus gives the President the choice to make an informed
or ill-informed decision.105 In this respect, the Opinions Clause diﬀers
markedly from analogous provisions in early state constitutions. Those state
provisions not only invited governors to gather advice from an executive
“council” but required the governors to obtain the “consent” or “approval” of
the council before taking certain actions.106 The federal Constitution created
no such mandatory council.107 The President has the discretion to seek as
much, or as little, advice as he chooses from his subordinates.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 (emphasis added).
Compare, e.g., Calabresi & Rhodes, supra note 87, at 1198 n.221 (asserting that “the Take Care
Clause bolsters the power-grant reading of the Vesting Clause of Article II”), with, e.g., Evan
Caminker, The Constitutionality of Qui Tam Actions, 99 YALE L.J. 341, 377 (1989) (“[T]he [T]ake
[C]are [C]lause is better understood as a directive that the President must execute the law
consistently with Congress’ will, rather than as a grant of exogenously deﬁned power . . . .”); Cass
R. Sunstein, Reviewing Agency Inaction After Heckler v. Chaney, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 653, 670 (1985)
(asserting that the Take Care Clause creates “a duty, not a license”). See also Tara Leigh Grove,
Standing Outside of Article III, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1311, 1322 n.41 (2014) (suggesting that “the Take
Care Clause may be both a grant of power and the imposition of a duty”).
104 See Gillian E. Metzger, The Constitutional Duty to Supervise, 124 YALE L.J. 1836, 1842, 187578 (2015) (relying in part on the Take Care Clause in arguing that “a duty to supervise [oﬃcials]
represents a basic precept of our federal constitutional structure”); see also David M. Driesen, Toward
a Duty-Based Theory of Executive Power, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 71, 72-73 (2009) (“[T]he Constitution
imposes a duty upon the President and all other executive branch oﬃcials to obey the law . . . .”).
105 See also infra Sections III.B.1, IV.A.
106 See PRAKASH, supra note 88, at 40-42 (discussing how under some state constitutions,
certain “exercises of [gubernatorial] power required the ‘advice,’ the ‘consent,’ or the ‘advice and
consent’ of a council”); see also AMAR, supra note 94, at 326 (“In sharp contrast to many state
governors who constitutionally had to win the votes of council majorities for various proposed
gubernatorial initiatives, the president would be his own man.”).
107 The Opinions Clause grew out of proposals to create a “council” of advisors for the
President. See MCCONNELL, supra note 91, at 57-58, 62-63 (discussing the proposals for an executive
council); Flaherty, supra note 91, at 1796-98 (describing proposed councils comprising the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court, Secretaries for various departments, and leaders of the House and
Senate). Interestingly, none of the proposals would have given the council veto power over any
presidential decision. Flaherty, supra note 91, at 1796-98; accord MCCONNELL, supra note 91, at 5758 (emphasizing that the Framers “reject[ed the] model of a council to advise and restrain the
executive magistrate, which existed in almost all the states”); see also Proto, supra note 90, at 193-95
(tracing the Opinions Clause to proposals for a “council of state” and “Privy Council,” whose
opinions would not be binding on the executive). Ultimately, the entire “council” idea was
102
103
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But this discretionary power also comes with an important corollary:
Absent an executive council, the President must take responsibility for his
(informed or ill-informed) decisions; he has no one to blame if things go
wrong.108 As Akhil Amar and others have underscored, the Opinions
Clause “concentrate[s] accountability for presidential actions on the
president himself.”109
B. The Interagency Consultation Process
Article II gives the President considerable power to structure the process
by which presidential directives are created. But the existing structure is
largely unknown in the legal academic literature. This Article thus oﬀers a
window into that process—drawing on both political science research and my
own interviews with executive branch oﬃcials from the Trump, Obama,
George W. Bush, and other administrations.110 Notably, these oﬃcials could
not share details about particular directives. The process for crafting
directives takes place almost entirely behind closed doors; the details are not
publicly available for many years (if at all).111 But the oﬃcials oﬀered
illuminating insights about the process itself.
A presidential directive may originate in one of two ways. The directive
might be “top down”: the President has a policy that he hopes to eﬀectuate,

abandoned—apparently in part out of a concern that the President would blame the council for bad
decisions. Flaherty, supra note 91, at 1797.
108 See supra note 107. To be sure, Presidents may still attempt to shift blame to others. But the
Opinions Clause is designed so as to make that more diﬃcult: the President cannot claim that he
was bound by the decision of an executive council.
109 AMAR, supra note 94, at 326-27 (arguing that “the animating spirit of the opinions clause”
was “to concentrate accountability for presidential actions on the president himself ” and that “the
central purpose” of the Opinions Clause was “to prevent presidents from evading blame by hiding
behind the opinions of advisers meeting in private”); accord MCCONNELL, supra note 91, at 57-58,
62-63 (discussing the Convention and Ratiﬁcation debates over the Opinions Clause and
emphasizing that the Founders sought to ensure the President’s “responsibility to the people”);
PRAKASH, supra note 88, at 194 (“[T]he word ‘opinions’ suggests that the ultimate decisions were
the president’s, not the principal oﬃcers’.”); Flaherty, supra note 91, at 1798 (agreeing that the
Opinions Clause “furthers presidential accountability”); Heidi Kitrosser, Accountability and
Administrative Structure, 45 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 607, 628 (2009) (“[T]his structure was geared to
ensure accountability . . . .”); Proto, supra note 90, at 194 (suggesting that the history behind the
Clause shows “the President has singular and ultimate accountability for his own decisions”).
110 See supra note 9 (listing interviewees).
111 See Andrew Rudalevige, Executive Orders and Presidential Unilateralism, 42
PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 138, 147-48 (2012) (noting the Office of Management and Budget
keeps a file on every executive order and that as of his 2012 article, “some executive order files
[were] available up to late 1987”).
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so he asks an agency or White House oﬃcial to draft a directive.112
Alternatively, the directive might be “bottom up”: an agency wants the
executive branch to adopt a policy, but it lacks the authority to bind other
agencies itself.113 In either event, the directive tends to go through a fairly
involved procedure.
1. Executive Orders and Proclamations
The process for issuing some directives—executive orders and
proclamations—is guided by executive order.114 Current oﬃcials still look to
President John F. Kennedy’s Executive Order 11,030.115 But as political
scientist Andrew Rudalevige has observed, the process—both on paper and
on the ground—goes back much further.116 Beginning in the 1930s, Presidents
issued a series of executive orders creating an interagency consultation
process that largely mirrors the process used today.117 Moreover, Kennedy’s
Executive Order 11,030 and its predecessors supply only the basic outlines;
many of the details discussed below are based on interviews or political
science research. (The footnotes make clear the source of the information.)118
112 See Egan Interview, supra note 9 (noting that sometimes the President “wants to take some
action”); see also MAYER, supra note 11, at 61 (“[E]xecutive orders typically either originate
from . . . the Executive Oﬃce of the President or percolate up from executive agencies desirous of
presidential action.”).
113 See, e.g., Fonzone Interview, supra note 9 (indicating that an agency may ask for a
directive, because the President can bind the entire executive branch); see also Rudalevige, supra
note 111, at 153 (reporting that more than 6 out of every 10 executive orders in his study were
initiated by federal agencies).
114 Notably, this process does not apply to “hortatory” directives that, as one former oﬃcial
put it, “simply announce ‘National Tree Day.’” De Interview, supra note 9. Such directives go through
a more streamlined process. See Exec. Order No. 12,080, 43 Fed. Reg. 42,235 (Sept. 18, 1978). Nor
does the process apply to international agreements. See Exec. Order No. 11,030, § 5, 27 Fed. Reg.
5847, 5848 (June 19, 1962).
115 See Exec. Order No. 11,030, 27 Fed. Reg. at 5847. There have been some minor
modiﬁcations. For example, President George W. Bush amended the order to reﬂect that directives
were likely to be created by computer, rather than typewriter. See Exec. Order No. 13,403, § 1(a), 71
Fed. Reg. 28,543, 28,543 (May 12, 2006) (changing from “typewritten” to “prepared”); see also Exec.
Order No. 12,608, § 2, 52 Fed. Reg. 34,617, 34,617 (Sept. 9, 1987) (noting a name change to “the
Oﬃce of Management and Budget”).
116 See Rudalevige, supra note 111, at 148 (noting that Franklin Roosevelt’s Executive Order
6247 in August 1933 was the ﬁrst that “created a standard process”).
117 Under orders issued by Presidents Franklin Roosevelt and Truman, the Bureau of the
Budget (the predecessor to the Oﬃce of Management and Budget) would review a proposed
executive order or proclamation; send the draft to the Attorney General for “form and legality”
review; and the resulting directive would be published in the Federal Register. Exec. Order No.
10,006, 13 Fed. Reg. 5927, 5927, 5929 (Oct. 9, 1948); Exec. Order No. 7298 (Feb. 18, 1936).
118 This Part ﬁrst lays out the typical process for crafting various types of presidential
directives and then discusses how Presidents sometimes deviate from these procedures. See infra
subsection II.B.3.
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a. The Process
Under Executive Order 11,030, the Oﬃce of Management and Budget
(OMB) oversees the process for an executive order or proclamation.119 Once
OMB receives a draft directive (which, as noted, has often been written by
agency oﬃcials),120 OMB shares the draft with other agencies that may have
an interest in the issue. Oﬃcials then oﬀer feedback, commenting on both
policy and legal matters. Agency oﬃcials will point out, for example, if a
statute prohibits that agency from carrying out the directive in the suggested
manner (or at all).121
Moreover, oﬃcials (and particularly legal counsel) often weigh in on the
precise wording of the directive at issue.122 Indeed, agency oﬃcials “pore[]
over” these texts—and may get into “heated arguments over the use of a
particular word”—because the resulting document could impact the power of
the agency itself.123 One former oﬃcial remarked, “The more important the
executive order, the more attention paid to the text.”124 Based on the feedback,
OMB will redraft the directive and send it out again for comment. Former

119 See Exec. Order No. 11,030, §2(a), 27 Fed. Reg. at 5847 (providing that the “Director of the
Bureau of the Budget” should oversee the process). President Reagan later modiﬁed the order to
reﬂect that the Bureau was renamed the Oﬃce of Management and Budget. Exec. Order No. 12,608,
§ 2, 52 Fed. Reg. at 34617.
120 See supra notes 112–113 and accompanying text. Kennedy’s order speciﬁcally contemplates
that agency oﬃcials will often draft the directive. See Exec. Order No. 11,030, § 2(a), 27 Fed. Reg.
at 5847 (requiring the “originating Federal agency” to submit the draft to be reviewed).
121 See Bies Interview, supra note 9 (noting that agency oﬃcials raise both “policy-based” and
“law-based” objections); Fonzone Interview, supra note 9 (reporting that the “coordination process”
is designed in part to make sure the President has the legal authority to issue a directive).
122 See Egan Interview, supra note 9 (detailing how agencies “absolutely” argued about the text,
explaining that “[t]he speciﬁc words do matter,” and providing an example: the Secretary of State
should act “in consultation with” the Treasury Secretary means the two should discuss the matter,
while “in coordination with” means the Treasury Secretary has a “veto” over the decision); McGahn
Interview, supra note 9 (stating that a great deal of care goes into the text, because agencies need
guidance on what to do); Otis Interview, supra note 9 (noting that oﬃcials were “very careful” about
the text); see also Luttig Interview, supra note 9 (recounting how lawyers tend to focus on the text).
123 Fonzone Interview, supra note 9 (asserting that the language is “pored over,” particularly if
the order would impact multiple agencies, and that “an incredible amount of work” goes in to
“resolving diﬀerences” among agencies); Gray Interview, supra note 9 (reporting that “a lot of care
would go into the drafting” of the text, “because this is like writing the law for the executive branch,”
and “[y]ou could get into heated arguments over the use of a particular word”); see also McGahn
Interview, supra note 9 (agreeing that agencies debate the language, perhaps because they might be
giving up power, or because they think they are better equipped to implement a given order).
124 Fonzone Interview, supra note 9; see also Gray Interview, supra note 9 (similarly noting that
more care would be devoted to important directives).
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oﬃcials suggested that many directives go through at least three drafts—and
three rounds of comments—before leaving OMB.125
The President is not necessarily absent at this stage of the process. If a
given directive is highly signiﬁcant, then White House or Cabinet oﬃcials
may ask the President to weigh in on a dispute among agencies.126 But my
research suggests that such direct presidential involvement is the exception
rather than the rule. Agency oﬃcials debate most directives among
themselves—with the oversight of OMB—and the President does not get
involved until a ﬁnal draft is ready for him to sign.
After the agency review, OMB sends the draft directive to the
Department of Justice’s Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) for “form and
legality” review.127 That is, OLC’s job is to make sure the executive order
or proclamation complies with the Constitution and any governing statutes
or regulations.128 Although there are debates about how searching a review
OLC provides, at least some directives apparently get stopped (or
modified) at this stage.129
The next stop in what one former oﬃcial described as a “marathon” is the
White House Staﬀ Secretary.130 Although this position is not well known,131

125 See Egan Interview, supra note 9; see also Gray Interview, supra note 9 (indicating that there
might also “be one or more meetings involving the agencies with the biggest interest to hash out
diﬀerences”).
126 See Gray Interview, supra note 9 (noting that “the President might get consulted part-way
through” and he “would make a decision on contested points 1, 2, 3” but would “not be bothered a
second or third time by appeals” from agency oﬃcials); see also Egan Interview, supra note 9
(asserting that the President “would almost certainly have been briefed and have opportunity to
provide views” on an important directive).
127 See Exec. Order No. 11,030, § 2(b), 27 Fed. Reg. 5847, 5847 (June 19, 1962) (requiring the
Attorney General to review “as to both form and legality”). The Attorney General has delegated
this function to OLC. See Oﬃce of Legal Counsel, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
https://www.justice.gov/olc [https://perma.cc/QK8W-NF64] (last visited Jan. 7, 2020) (“By
delegation from the Attorney General, . . . the Oﬃce of Legal Counsel provides legal advice to the
President and all executive branch agencies . . . . All executive orders and substantive proclamations
proposed to be issued by the President are reviewed by the Oﬃce of Legal Counsel for form and
legality . . . .”).
128 See Douglas W. Kmiec, OLC’s Opinion Writing Function: The Legal Adhesive for a Unitary
Executive, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 337, 359-65 (1993); see also Shalev Roisman, Presidential Factfinding,
72 VAND. L. REV. 825, 878 (2019) (noting OLC review “does not appear to require any sort of
rigorous review of the facts underlying the order”).
129 Kmiec, supra note 128, at 359 (noting “form and legality” letters “may be viewed by some,
outside of OLC, as mere legal ‘formalities,’” but disputing that notion); see also Luttig Interview,
supra note 9 (reporting that during his time at OLC, he carefully reviewed each document, but
stating that the OLC culture is to oﬀer an “expansive understanding” of presidential power).
130 De Interview, supra note 9.
131 The position recently got attention, however, because the most recent Supreme Court
nominee Brett Kavanaugh is a former Staﬀ Secretary. See Jessica Gresko, Senators Spar on Access to
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the Staﬀ Secretary plays an integral role in the promulgation of every
presidential document.132 The Staﬀ Secretary reviews the draft directive and
often engages in another layer of consultation—this time, within the White
House; the Staﬀ Secretary checks to make sure that “relevant constituencies”
within the Executive Oﬃce of the President are on board with the
directive.133 Finally (and possibly after some additional edits), the Staﬀ
Secretary sends the directive to the President.134
What does the President see? Notably, the President does not receive a
copy of every comment by agency oﬃcials on earlier drafts of the directive.
As a few former oﬃcials put it, the comments range from “thoughtful” to
“crazy” or even “nonsense.”135 Instead, the President receives three
documents: (1) the text of the directive; (2) OLC’s “form and legality”
certiﬁcation; and (3) a memo (typically prepared by the Staﬀ Secretary or
another White House oﬃcial) summarizing the interagency consultation
process and any remaining points of disagreement—with a focus on “highlevel objections” from Cabinet members or other top oﬃcials.136 The
President then opts to sign (or not sign) the directive.137

Kavanaugh’s
Staﬀ
Secretary
Work,
ASSOCIATED
PRESS
(July
27,
2018),
https://apnews.com/4e272e40fe914e19a1d67212bae99056 [https://perma.cc/R42C-XX97].
132 See De Interview, supra note 9 (describing his work as Obama Staﬀ Secretary); Presidential
Departments,
THE
WHITE
HOUSE,
https://www.whitehouse.gov/getinvolved/internships/presidential-departments [https://perma.cc/B48Y-HE6Y] (last visited Oct. 15,
2019) (describing the Staﬀ Secretary as “the gate-keeper of paper ﬂowing into and out of the Oval
Oﬃce”).
133 See De Interview, supra note 9 (noting that most of the “vetting” for executive orders
happens through the interagency consultation process headed by OMB but, as Staﬀ Secretary, he
would also “mak[e] sure relevant constituencies in the White House” were “on board”); see also Bies
Interview, supra note 9 (detailing how “OMB runs the agency clearance” process, while the “Staﬀ
Secretary runs White House clearance”).
134 See De Interview, supra note 9.
135 E.g., id. (reporting that the comments ranged from “thoughtful things” to “nonsense”);
Egan Interview, supra note 9 (describing some comments as “crazy,” some “not-so-crazy”).
136 See De Interview, supra note 9; Gray Interview, supra note 9 (reporting that the President
received the summary memo and “of course” would get the text “because that is what the [President]
signs”); Egan Interview, supra note 9 (relating how the President receives the text of the order along
with an “action memorandum” that describes only “high-level objections”).
137 Former oﬃcials told me that the President typically signs the directive, although there are
occasions when he will “kick it back.” Gray Interview, supra note 9; see also Egan Interview, supra
note 9. The text of the executive order or proclamation is then published in the Federal Register.
Exec. Order No. 11,030, § 3, 27 Fed. Reg. 5847, 5848 (June 19, 1962); see also 44 U.S.C. § 1505(a)
(2018) (requiring proclamations and executive orders with “general applicability and legal eﬀect” to
be published in the Federal Register).

2020]

Presidential Laws & the Missing Interpretive Theory

905

b. Examples
A scuﬄe within the Carter Administration illustrates the negotiation
process among agencies. As political scientist Kenneth Mayer recounts, there
was a dispute among federal agencies over a draft executive order that would
implement the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).138 The main
issue was whether (and the extent to which) the order should direct federal
agencies to prepare environmental impact statements for actions in foreign
countries.139 Although the Council on Environmental Quality pushed for a
broad order, a string of federal agencies—including the State Department,
the Defense Department, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission—insisted
that NEPA should be limited to domestic conduct.140
Given the importance of the issue, President Carter weighed in during the
agency review. Although Carter reportedly favored a broad interpretation of
NEPA,141 that is not the position he took. Instead, as Mayer explains, Carter
opted to “split[] the difference” among the agencies.142 The resulting
directive—Executive Order 12,114—required environmental impact statements
for some foreign actions but contained a number of restrictions and
exemptions; for example, nuclear facilities were exempted, as the State
Department had requested.143
Accordingly, President Carter made the ultimate decision to issue the
directive. But the content was not his first-best policy choice. Nor was this
an exceptional case. As Rudalevige recounts (based on detailed archival
research of executive orders from the Truman through the Reagan
Administrations, as well as data from the Clinton Administration),
Presidents have often issued compromise orders, accommodating the
competing recommendations of agencies.144
Indeed, this interagency consultation process may even lead the President
to issue a largely toothless order. An episode from the Clinton
138 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4370h (2018) (enacting the National Environmental Policy Act);
MAYER, supra note 11, at 61-65.
139 See MAYER, supra note 11, at 61-65 (describing “a protracted wrangle between the foreign
aﬀairs/defense and environmental agencies about the foreign application of ” NEPA).
140 See id. at 62 (the concern was that “applying NEPA abroad would undercut foreign policy
objectives . . . and interfere with foreign trade and economic development programs”).
141 Id.
142 Id. at 63-64 (“Carter himself resolved the outstanding issues . . . more or less splitting the
diﬀerence between the agencies”).
143 Exec. Order No. 12,114, 44 Fed. Reg. 1957 (Jan. 9, 1979); MAYER, supra note 11, at 64 (noting
the order’s requirements were far less than NEPA demanded of domestic conduct).
144 See Rudalevige, supra note 111, at 142-44, 150-51 (discussing the history of executive order
negotiations within the executive branch); see also MAYER, supra note 11, at 65 (“The story of
Executive Order 12114 is hardly exceptional . . . .”).
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Administration illustrates this point. A proposed executive order would have
required federal agencies to evaluate the eﬀect of agency action on children’s
environmental health—and, to the extent an agency “failed to protect
children fully,” to explain and justify that failure.145 Although one might think
that children’s health would be an uncontroversial topic, the directive went
through months of negotiations.146 As Rudalevige describes, some agencies
worried that the order would open them up to lawsuits; the Department of
Health and Human Services wondered how it could legitimately say that
“tobacco remained a legal product,” given that “[b]anning it would clearly be
better for children’s health.”147 Even after White House oﬃcials had
substantially softened the language of the order, President Clinton himself
weighed in, suggesting that he “might want to ease [the] burden a bit”
more.148 The ﬁnal order did instruct agencies to pay attention to children’s
environmental health, but only “to the extent permitted by law” and only as
“appropriate, and consistent with the agency’s mission.”149
Finally, the interagency consultation process may block new directives
entirely—even those strongly favored by the President. This point is
underscored by a lengthy debate over Lyndon Johnson’s Executive Order
11,246, which not only prohibits government contractors from discriminating
on the basis of “race, creed, color, or national origin” but also requires them
to engage in “aﬃrmative action.”150 When aﬃrmative action became a more
controversial topic in the 1980s and 1990s, so did Executive Order 11,246. The
order was a thorn in the side of the Reagan and George H.W. Bush

Rudalevige, supra note 111, at 142-43.
See id. at 142-44 (recounting the four-month-long debate over the proposed order).
Id. at 144.
Id. (internal quotations omitted). Additionally, “[e]ven as the president was urged to issue
the order, several departments continued to press their reservations” and “President Clinton
requested still more changes.” Id.
149 See Exec. Order 13,045, § 1, 62 Fed. Reg. 19,885, 19,885 (April 21, 1997) (“[T]o the extent
permitted by law and appropriate, and consistent with the agency’s mission, each Federal agency:
(a) shall make it a high priority to identify and assess environmental health risks . . . that may
disproportionately aﬀect children; and (b) shall ensure that its” actions address those risks).
150 Exec. Order No. 11,246, § 202(1), 30 Fed. Reg. 12,319, 12,320 (Sept. 24, 1965). Interestingly,
language barring discrimination on the basis of “sex” came from Executive Order 11,375, which
President Lyndon Johnson issued a few years later. Exec. Order No. 11,375, 32 Fed. Reg. 14,303,
14,304 (Oct. 13, 1967). Yet courts and commentators commonly refer to the sum total of the orders
as “Executive Order 11,246.” See, e.g., Contractors Assoc. of E. Pa. v. Sec’y of Labor, 442 F.2d 159,
163 n.6 (3d Cir. 1971) (stating that the prohibition of sex discrimination “comes from Exec. Order
No. 11375, . . . and represents a minor change from the original” order) (emphasis added); see also
United States v. Duquesne Light Comp., 423 F. Supp. 507, 508-10 (W.D. Pa. 1976) (discussing only
Executive Order 11,246 in a suit alleging “discriminat[ion] against blacks and women”).
145
146
147
148
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Administrations, and both attempted to issue a new order to revoke it.151
Notably, presidential directives remain in force until they are revised or
revoked.152 And executive oﬃcials assume that any new directive—even one
modifying a prior directive—should go through the same basic process.153
This process did not go smoothly for Presidents Reagan or Bush. Although
the Department of Justice strongly pushed for revocation of Executive Order
11,246, the Office of Equal Employment Opportunity and the Department of
Labor adamantly fought to retain the executive order.154 Moreover, Mayer
reports that the Labor Department’s “congressional allies” heard about the
planned revocation (as did some civil rights groups), and they pressured each
administration to stay the course.155 Ultimately, both Presidents Reagan and
Bush backed down and left Executive Order 11,246 in place.156
2. Other Directives
Kennedy’s Executive Order 11,030 applies only to directives labeled as
“executive orders” or “proclamations.”157 Since at least the George H.W. Bush
Administration, Presidents have also relied on presidential “memoranda,”
which are in substance identical to executive orders.158 Moreover, since the
mid-twentieth century, Presidents have issued national security directives
under various labels—for example, “policy papers,” “presidential policy
directives,” or simply “directives.”159 There is no oﬃcial process for crafting
151 See MAYER, supra note 11, at 206-10 (describing these eﬀorts and noting “[b]y the 1980s
aﬃrmative action” was “anathema to the Reagan administration”).
152 See COOPER, supra note 21, at 2 (noting that “executive orders and other
pronouncements . . . remain in eﬀect” until “they are amended, superseded, or rescinded”).
153 See De Interview, supra note 9 (relating that the same basic process was used for substantive
revisions); Gray Interview, supra note 9 (asserting that the process was and should be “the same”).
154 MAYER, supra note 11, at 206-08; RICARDO JOSÉ PEREIRA RODRIGUES, THE
PREEMINENCE OF POLITICS: EXECUTIVE ORDERS FROM EISENHOWER TO CLINTON 82-83
(2007). Notably, the Labor Department enforces Executive Order 11,246. See Exec. Order No. 11,246,
§201, 30 Fed. Reg. 12,319, 12,319 (Sept. 24, 1965).
155 MAYER, supra note 11, at 207-08.
156 See id. at 209-10, 213 (“Executive Order 11246 ha[s] proved amazingly durable.”). After the
Supreme Court’s decision in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena (which involved separate
requirements for government contractors), the Clinton Administration made changes to Executive
Order 11,246. See 515 U.S. 200, 206-10, 235-39 (1995) (holding that all governmental racial
classiﬁcations must be subject to strict scrutiny); MAYER, supra note 11, at 210-12 (reporting that “the
changes were conﬁned to contracting set-asides, not to the aﬃrmative action employment practices
required of government contractors”).
157 Exec. Order No. 11,030, 27 Fed. Reg. 5847, 5847 (June 19, 1962).
158 See COOPER, supra note 21, at 16 (describing how memoranda are “sometimes us[ed]
. . . interchangeably with executive orders”).
159 Id. at 207-09. My research suggests that courts rarely weigh in on the meaning of national
security directives. That is perhaps not surprising, given that many are classiﬁed. See id. at 209 (“The
vast majority of these [national security] directives are classiﬁed . . . .”).
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these directives. Yet my interviews indicate that these directives also go
through agency review.160 As one former Staﬀ Secretary explained, there is
no “formalistic distinction” among documents; “a great deal of care” generally
goes into any “product that the President is going to sign.”161
The main diﬀerences are that OMB does not oversee the creation of
memoranda or national security directives, and OLC does not necessarily
review the documents for “form and legality.”162 Instead, the White House
Counsel’s oﬃce (or another entity in the Executive Oﬃce of the President)
generally oversees the process.163 But the process otherwise appears to be
quite similar. The relevant entity in the White House sends the draft (which,
again, is often written by agency oﬃcials) to interested agencies, gets
feedback on both law and policy, redrafts, and then sends it out again, perhaps
multiple times.164 As with executive orders and proclamations, the President
may be consulted to the extent there are disputes about important
directives.165 The document then goes to the Staﬀ Secretary, who may invite
additional comments.166
The Staﬀ Secretary sends the text of the resulting directive to the
President, along with a memo summarizing the interagency consultation
process (again, with a focus on “high-level” issues).167 Thus, the President
does not hear about every single agency comment, but former oﬃcials stated
that it would be “very bad form” not to advise the President about major
disagreements from Cabinet or other top oﬃcials.168 The President then
decides whether to sign the resulting document.169
See infra notes 162–168 and accompanying text.
De Interview, supra note 9.
See Bies Interview, supra note 9; Egan Interview, supra note 9.
See Egan Interview, supra note 9 (detailing how “by tradition,” the process is run by “the
part of the [White House] responsible for that policy” and that entity endeavors to make sure the
issues are “fully developed” and “thoroughly reviewed” by relevant agencies).
164 See Fonzone Interview, supra note 9 (describing how agencies “with expertise are consulted”
and they “likely” helped “draft [the directive] in the ﬁrst instance”); Gray Interview, supra note 9
(explaining that regardless of the document’s label, “the proposed document would be circulated for
comment”).
165 See Gray Interview, supra note 9 (discussing how the President might be consulted and then
he “would make a decision on contested points 1, 2, 3”).
166 See De Interview, supra note 9.
167 The President receives the text of the directive along with an “action memorandum” that
describes only “high-level objections.” Egan Interview, supra note 9. See also De Interview, supra note
9 (explaining that the “package to the President” includes the text and the summary memo).
168 Egan Interview, supra note 9; see also Fonzone Interview, supra note 9 (asserting that a “good
staﬀer” must inform the President about any major disagreements among agencies).
169 If the President signs the directive, he may—and often does—publish the resulting
document in the Federal Register. See 44 U.S.C. § 1505(a) (2018) (providing that presidential
proclamations, orders, and other documents the President determines to have “general applicability
and legal eﬀect” shall be published in the Federal Register).
160
161
162
163
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3. Deviations
There is another factor that further diminishes the distinction among
directives: whether a directive is styled as an “executive order,”
“proclamation,” “memorandum,” or something else entirely, executive actors
feel free to use a diﬀerent process.170 In other words, Presidents do not
consistently follow Kennedy’s Executive Order 11,030.
In this way, Presidents take full advantage of the ﬂexibility oﬀered by the
Opinions Clause. That provision gives the President the discretion to seek
out as much, or as little, counsel as he deems necessary.171 And as several
former oﬃcials (from both Democratic and Republican administrations)
explained, there are reasons why the President may seek advice on certain
directives from a smaller group. Some executive orders are “politically
sensitive.”172 If such draft orders are broadly distributed to agency oﬃcials
(through the usual OMB process), the existence of that draft may be leaked
before it has been fully vetted.173 Accordingly, the White House Counsel’s
Oﬃce may oversee the agency review itself (or ask OMB to use a diﬀerent
process), sending the draft order only to high-level agency oﬃcials who will
be more cautious about sharing the information.174 Some orders may even
skip OLC “form and legality” review.175 Accordingly, regardless of the label,
a President may opt for a modiﬁed process.

170 See MAYER, supra note 11, at 60-61 (“There is no penalty for avoiding” Kennedy’s Executive
Order 11,030, and thus “when the White House is under time pressure it routinely bypasses the
formal routine.”). As one interviewee explained, there was no “formalistic” divide between an
“executive order,” “proclamation,” or other document, and no particular “machinery” for any given
directive. De Interview, supra note 9. The White House might use a formal process for a
memorandum or a truncated process for an executive order. Id.
171 The Opinions Clause, as interpreted in this Article, both explains and justiﬁes presidential
departures from Executive Order 11,030. Because the Opinions Clause gives the President the
discretion to seek as much or as little advice from his subordinates as he sees ﬁt, Executive Order
11,030 can only provide guidelines, rather than binding rules.
172 De Interview, supra note 9 (explaining that the White House might use a diﬀerent process
for a “sensitive” executive order); Luttig Interview, supra note 9 (noting that “[i]f you’ve got
something politically sensitive, politically focused,” then you would not follow the regular process);
see also Gray Interview, supra note 9 (stating that such departures were “rare” during the George
H.W. Bush Administration).
173 See De Interview, supra note 9 (describing the Oﬃce of Management and Budget as akin
to a “machine” that has a formal process in place for executive orders, but that a very well-meaning
career person might share a “sensitive” draft order too broadly).
174 See Egan Interview, supra note 9 (agreeing that an executive order might bypass the typical
process if it is “sensitive” and noting that OMB itself has ways to “expedite” the process, at least in
the national security realm).
175 Political scientist Kenneth Mayer reports that the “most commonly skipped step” is OLC
“form and legality” review. MAYER, supra note 11, at 60-61. According to Mayer, in such cases, OMB
staﬀ “rely[] on informal legal guidance as a substitute.” Id.
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Nevertheless, oﬃcials repeatedly reaﬃrmed that virtually all directives go
through some type of agency review. Moreover, for any directive, the process
can be tedious. Although it is easier to issue a presidential directive than to
enact legislation, the process takes a good deal longer than one might
expect—anywhere from several weeks to several months (or even years).176
Indeed, one former oﬃcial remarked that “newbies” in his oﬃce would
complain that it could “take forever” to issue a presidential directive.177
III. THE CASE FOR TEXTUALISM
The Opinions Clause of Article II invites the President to seek out advice
from his subordinates in order to make a more informed decision. I argue
that Presidents have exercised that power in structuring the interagency
consultation process for presidential directives. Many directives go through
weeks or even months of negotiation; after that process, the President may
well decide to issue a compromise or toothless directive—or perhaps no
directive at all. Through this process, Presidents have (perhaps surprisingly)
exercised the power to tie their own hands—and accept the recommendations
of their subordinates.
Although Article II does not require the President to engage in such
consultation, the existence of this process has important implications for
interpreting presidential directives. A court should not assume that any
directive perfectly implements its apparent purposes; nor should a court
assume that the directive reﬂects the President’s preferred substantive policy.
Any presidential directive may reﬂect the President’s own decision to balance
competing interests. Alternatively, and particularly when the President opts
for a truncated process, he may well issue a directive that, in hindsight,
appears to be ill-considered. The Constitution gives him the power to make—
and holds him accountable for—those ill-informed decisions as well. Federal
courts, I argue, can best give eﬀect to these presidential decisions by adhering
to the text of a directive.
A. Preliminary Questions: Author’s Intent or Purpose?
Once we turn our focus to Article II, a natural assumption might be that
interpreters should focus on the intent of the President. After all, in sharp
176 See Egan Interview, supra note 9 (“[S]ometimes these documents are argued over in the
executive branch for weeks or months . . . .”); MAYER, supra note 11, at 61 (“Simple executive orders
navigate this process in a few weeks; complex orders can take years, and can even be derailed over
the inability to obtain the necessary consensus or clearances.”).
177 Egan Interview, supra note 9 (describing how some oﬃcials viewed the process as
“ineﬃcient or bureaucratic”).
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contrast to statutes enacted under Article I (which must receive the assent of
the multi-member Congress and the President), presidential directives seem
to have a unitary author. For similar reasons, one might assume that any
public statements made by the President should inform the meaning of
presidential directives.178
These assumptions are very reasonable—until one learns about the
complex process that Presidents have crafted for issuing presidential
directives. As discussed, interpretive theorists assume that the process for
creating a document should inform interpretive theory, and Presidents use a
distinct process to create presidential laws.
Presidents, of course, say a lot of things—in the State of the Union
Address, other speeches, interviews, press conferences, and even on
Twitter.179 But not every presidential declaration becomes a presidential law.
Instead, that designation is limited to a subset of presidential issuances—
those labeled “executive orders,” “proclamations,” “memoranda” and the
like—that aim to direct the actions of subordinate oﬃcials.180 This
178 To be clear, this Article focuses on the meaning, not the validity, of presidential directives.
For arguments that public statements by the President should be relevant to an analysis of
constitutionally impermissible motive, see Shaw, supra note 4 at 1372-74, 1386-97; see also Aziz Z.
Huq, What Is Discriminatory Intent?, 103 CORNELL L. REV. 1211, 1273 (2018) (arguing for
consideration of campaign statements to assess presidential intent). This Article thus does not
address whether the Supreme Court should have considered President Trump’s public statements in
evaluating the constitutionality of the third version of the travel ban. See Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S.
Ct. 2392, 2416-23 (2018) (rejecting an Establishment Clause challenge to the ban despite “statements
by the President . . . casting doubt on the oﬃcial[ly]” stated purpose of the ban). For an insightful
analysis of constitutionally impermissible motive in the legislative context, see generally Richard H.
Fallon, Jr., Constitutionally Forbidden Legislative Intent, 130 HARV. L. REV. 523 (2016). For a deep
historical look at judicial examination of legislative purpose, see Caleb Nelson, Judicial Review of
Legislative Purpose, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1784, 1795-1859 (2008).
179 For a recent overview of presidential speech, see generally Katherine Shaw, Beyond the Bully
Pulpit: Presidential Speech in the Courts, 96 TEX. L. REV. 71 (2017).
180 Since 1935, these directives (regardless of the label) have generally been published in the
Federal Register. See 44 U.S.C. § 1505(a) (2018); see also supra notes 24–25, 35–43 (citing presidential
directives). To distinguish presidential laws from other presidential speech, courts could use
publication in the Federal Register as a “rule of recognition.”
This Article brackets that issue, in large part because there seems to be widespread agreement
as to what constitutes a presidential law as opposed to other speech. See, e.g., Shaw, supra note 4,
at 93 (differentiating “presidential speech” from “presidential action” like executive orders,
presidential memoranda, proclamations, and executive agreements). This well-established
distinction between presidential “speech” and “action” is illustrated by the recent controversy
surrounding transgender individuals in the military. In a series of tweets, President Trump
declared that “the United States Government will not accept or allow transgender individuals to
serve in any capacity in the U.S. Military.” Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER
(July 26, 2017, 5:55 AM), https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/890193981585444864
[https://perma.cc/3GKL-J2DT]; Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (July 26,
2017,
6:04
AM),
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/890196164313833472
[https://perma.cc/Y4CE-NRES]. But the Department of Defense took no action until the
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designation as a presidential law is important, because such laws bind not only
lower-level oﬃcials but also future presidential administrations. As my
interviews underscored, executive oﬃcials assume that a presidential
directive governs all successive administrations until the directive is formally
revised or revoked.181 Other presidential speeches do not have the same
binding force across administrations.
For these presidential laws, Presidents rely on a complex process
through which agency officials draft, revise, and redraft directives. At the
end of this process, a President may opt to sign a directive that does not
reflect his preferred substantive policy (“purpose”) or wishes (“intent”).182
Relatedly, as discussed further below, the resulting directive may be in
considerable tension with the President’s other public statements.183 The
President may opt for compromise in the directive, taking into account the
competing wishes of agency officials.
The process for crafting presidential directives thus oﬀers an important
illustration of what Daphna Renan calls the President’s “two bodies”: the
often uncertain “relationship between the person of the president and
the . . . institution of the presidency.”184 In this context, individual Presidents
have chosen to rely largely on the institution of the presidency to determine

President followed up with a formal memorandum. See Memorandum on Military Service by
Transgender Individuals, § 1(b), 82 Fed. Reg. 41,319 (Aug. 25, 2017) (directing relevant officials
to terminate the official policy allowing “military service by transgender individuals”); Bryan
Bender & Jacqueline Klimas, Pentagon Takes No Steps to Enforce Trump’s Transgender Ban,
POLITICO (June 27, 2017, 11:28 AM), https://www.politico.com/story/2017/07/27/trumptransgender-military-ban-no-modification-241029 [https://perma.cc/UK58-NC2C] (explaining
that the Department of Defense did not treat the initial tweets as a binding directive). Even if
executive officials in the Trump Administration had treated the tweets as a presidential directive,
it is highly unlikely that any subsequent administration would have done so. By contrast, a
subsequent administration will treat a presidential memorandum as a directive that remains in
force until it is revoked. See infra note 181 and accompanying text.
181 Notably, every oﬃcial I interviewed treated the binding nature of directives as a given. See
supra notes 152–153 and accompanying text. This accords with both oﬃcial declarations of the
executive branch and political science research. See, e.g., O.L.C., Legal Eﬀectiveness, supra note 23,
at 29-30 (“[A] presidential directive . . . would remain in force, unless otherwise speciﬁed, pending
any future presidential action.”); COOPER, supra note 21, at 2 (“[E]xecutive orders and other
pronouncements . . . remain in eﬀect unless and until they are amended, superseded, or rescinded.”).
182 To be sure, “intent” is a challenging concept, one that is not always clearly deﬁned or
distinguished from “purpose.” But one can think of “intent” as a wish for how a law will be applied
in a particular case, while “purpose” is “the general aim or policy which pervades a [law] but has yet
to ﬁnd speciﬁc application.” Manning, supra note 70, at 1291 n.22 (quoting Archibald Cox, Judge
Learned Hand and the Interpretation of Statutes, 60 HARV. L. REV. 370, 370-71 (1947)).
183 See infra subsection III.B.2.b; Section III.C.
184 Daphna Renan, The President’s Two Bodies, 120 COLUM. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020)
(manuscript at 1), https://ssrn/com/abstract=3505345 (emphasis added).
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the contours of presidential directives. That is, individual Presidents have
ceded considerable power to the broader administrative apparatus.
Part IV explores some reasons why Presidents may choose to tie their own
hands through the interagency consultation process. But for now, it is important
to understand that presidential directives often do not reflect the author’s intent
or perfectly carry out a single purpose. It turns out that “unilateral” presidential
directives are less unilateral than one might have presumed.
B. Consultation and Presidential Decisionmaking
Presidential directives are often the product of a compromise among
agencies. I argue here that a focus on the text will enable courts to best capture
those presidential decisions. But I ﬁrst examine the less common (but still
important) scenario: when the President bypasses most of the established
process. Article II, I suggest, has lessons for that scenario as well.
1. Lack of Consultation and Accountability
In January 2017, President Trump issued his ﬁrst travel ban, which
suspended the entry of individuals from seven predominantly Muslim
countries.185 Although we still do not know the details of the process leading
up to that directive, there seems to be widespread agreement that it bypassed
virtually all agency review.186 Notably, that was true, even though the
directive was styled as an “executive order.”
In the litigation over that first travel ban, one central issue was whether
the White House Counsel could (after the fact) issue a memorandum
185 See Travel Ban Version One, supra note 24, § 3(c), at 8978 (suspending entry from countries
referred to in 8 U.S.C. § 1187(a)(12)); see also Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151, 1156 (9th Cir.
2017) (“[S]ection 3(c) of the Executive Order suspends for 90 days the entry of aliens from seven
countries: Iraq, Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen.”).
186 See Evan Perez, Pamela Brown & Kevin Liptak, Inside the Confusion of the Trump Executive
Order
and
Travel
Ban,
CNN
(Jan.
30,
2017,
11:29
AM),
https://www.cnn.com/2017/01/28/politics/donald-trump-travel-ban/index.html
[https://perma.cc/QE55-52Q2] (reporting that the White House contended that “OLC signed oﬀ
and agency review was performed,” but “[a] source said the creation of the executive order did not
follow the standard agency review process”); Kim Soﬀen & Darla Cameron, How Trump’s Travel
Ban Broke from the Normal Executive Order Process, WASH. POST (Feb. 9, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/politics/trump-travel-ban-process/
[https://perma.cc/L2JG-SJ2J] (reporting that the order was reviewed by the OLC, but that it
skipped most, if not all, of the consultation process). Some federal courts accepted the reports that
the ﬁrst travel ban bypassed most review. See, e.g., Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 241 F.
Supp. 3d 539, 545 (D. Md.) (“The drafting process . . . did not involve traditional interagency review
. . . . [T]here was no consultation with the Department of State, the Department of Defense, the
Department of Justice, or the Department of Homeland Security.”), aﬀ ’d in part, vacated in part, 857
F.3d 554 (4th Cir. 2017).
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narrowing the scope of the Executive Order.187 The issue arose out of
confusion over whether the ban applied to lawful permanent residents
(LPRs).188 The text was certainly broad enough to encompass such
individuals. The President “proclaim[ed] that the immigrant and
nonimmigrant entry . . . of aliens from [the seven] countries . . . would be
detrimental to the interests of the United States” and thus “suspend[ed]
entry . . . of such persons for 90 days.”189 Moreover, the Executive Order
expressly “exclude[d]” certain visa holders from the travel ban, including
“foreign nationals traveling on diplomatic visas.”190 LPRs were notably
absent from the list of exceptions. But soon after the Executive Order was
challenged in court, the White House Counsel issued a memorandum
“clarify[ing]” that the ban did not “apply to lawful permanent residents.”191
Federal courts disagreed sharply over whether they should accept the
“clariﬁcation” oﬀered by the White House Counsel.192 The lessons of the
constitutional structure strongly suggest that the answer should be no.193
The Opinions Clause of Article II permits, but does not require, the
President to seek advice from subordinates. Accordingly, the President had
the constitutional power to forgo agency review. But another lesson of the
Opinions Clause is that the President must be accountable for the resulting
(perhaps ill-informed) decision. Our Constitution created no council of
See, e.g., Louhghalam v. Trump, 230 F. Supp. 3d 26, 32-33 (D. Mass. 2017).
Id.
Travel Ban Version One, supra note 24, § 3(c), at 8978.
Id.
Memorandum from Donald F. McGahn II, Counsel to the President, to the Acting Sec’y
of State, the Acting Att’y Gen., & Sec’y of Homeland Sec. (Feb. 1, 2017), https://case.edu/executiveorder-updates/docs/f.pdf [http://perma.cc/Q4GQ-HPCK].
192 Compare Louhghalam, 230 F. Supp. at 32-33 (concluding, based in part on the White House
Counsel’s memorandum, that the executive order did not apply to lawful permanent residents, and
thus the claims as to those plaintiﬀs were moot), with Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151, 1165-66
(9th Cir. 2017) (declining to credit the memorandum in considering mootness of claims) and Aziz
v. Trump, 234 F. Supp. 3d. 724, 727-28 (E.D. Va. 2017) (same).
193 Under the Presidential Subdelegation Act of 1950, the President may delegate certain
functions, such as clarifying a directive, to subordinates via directive. 3 U.S.C. § 301 (2018). But that
statute did not apply here for two reasons. First, the statute permits delegation only to an oﬃcial
subject to Senate conﬁrmation. Id. The White House Counsel does not undergo a Senate vote. See
Jeremy Rabkin, At the President’s Side: The Role of the White House Counsel in Constitutional Policy, 56
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 63, 63-64 (1993) (observing that although “[t]he Attorney General
(along with other top oﬃcers in the Justice Department) must be conﬁrmed by the Senate,” the
White House Counsel and his aides “are appointed at the sole discretion of the president”). Second,
any such delegation must be in the text of the directive or otherwise published in the Federal
Register. See 3 U.S.C. § 301 (2018) (“Such designation and authorization shall be in writing [and]
shall be published in the Federal Register . . . .”). President Trump’s order said nothing about a
delegation to the White House Counsel. Travel Ban Version One, supra note 24, § 3(c), at 8978.
Notably, such issues of presidential delegation present many challenging questions that are beyond
the scope of this Article.
187
188
189
190
191
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advisors with veto power over presidential decisions—and thus no council for
the President to blame if things went wrong.194 A logical corollary of that
structural principle would be that the President’s subordinates also cannot ﬁx
any presidential errors after the fact. The Opinions Clause “concentrate[s]
accountability for presidential action on the president himself.”195
2. Consultation, Compromise, and Even Toothless Directives
As commentators suggested at the time of the ﬁrst travel ban, and as my
own research conﬁrmed, most directives go through a far more searching
review. This process has important implications for interpretive method. At
the end of the interagency consultation process, Presidents may opt to issue
compromise or even watered-down directives. I argue that federal courts
should respect the President’s decision to accept half a loaf. And courts can
best respect that decision by adhering to the text.
a. Compromise Directives
As we have seen, when agencies in the Carter Administration were
divided over a draft executive order, the President “split[] the diﬀerence”
among the agencies and issued an order that did not reﬂect his preferred
substantive policy.196 Along the same lines, a President may opt to issue a
directive that does not perfectly implement its apparent purposes. For that
reason, I argue that courts should adhere to the limitations in the text, rather
than attempt to carry out the apparent purpose of a directive.
A dispute over an executive order issued by President Clinton under the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) helps to illustrate
this point.197 The IEEPA permits the President to block financial
transactions involving a country that presents a national security threat.198

See supra Section II.A.
AMAR, supra note 94, at 326.
MAYER, supra note 11, at 63-64; see supra subsection II.B.1.b.
See infra notes 198–212 and accompanying text.
50 U.S.C. §§ 1701–1702 (2018). IEEPA executive orders have led to assorted litigation.
See Kirschenbaum v. 650 Fifth Ave., 830 F.3d 107, 117, 124-25, 142 (2d Cir. 2016) (addressing the
definition of “Iran” in Exec. Order No. 13,599, 77 Fed. Reg. 6659 (Feb. 5, 2012)); United States
v. Hassanzadeh, 271 F.3d 574, 576, 579, 581-83 (4th Cir. 2001) (determining that goods “of Iranian
origin” encompass Persian rugs under Exec. Order No. 12,613, 52 Fed. Reg. 41,940 (Oct. 29,
1987)); United States v. Elashi, 440 F. Supp. 2d 536, 541-43, 568-69 (N.D. Tex. 2006) (concluding
that the defendant’s property fell within the ban in Exec. Order No. 12,947, 60 Fed. Reg. 5,079
(Jan. 23, 1995)).
194
195
196
197
198
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Any person who violates such an executive order may be subject to civil or
criminal penalties.199
Mohammad Reza Ehsan was criminally prosecuted for violating Clinton’s
Executive Order 12,959, which prohibited the “export[]” of goods to Iran.200
Ehsan had ordered the shipment of a product from the United States to
Dubai, apparently planning to send it later to Iran.201 Ehsan argued, however,
that this shipment was “not an impermissible ‘export’” (from the United
States to Iran) but a permissible “export” (from the United States to Dubai)
and “reexport” (from Dubai to Iran).202
There was considerable support for Ehsan’s interpretation in the text of
the order. Executive Order 12,959 broadly barred “the exportation from the
United States to Iran . . . of any goods, technology . . . or services.”203 But the
order prohibited “the reexportation to Iran” only of “any goods or
technology” subject to certain licensing requirements.204 All parties agreed
that Ehsan’s product was not subject to those licensing rules.205 Moreover, the
term “export” is often used to refer to the movement of goods from the
United States to a foreign country, while “reexport” refers to the shipment of
goods from a foreign country to another foreign country.206
Executive Order 12,959 appeared to reﬂect a compromise. The primary
focus was, of course, ensuring that products were not sent directly from the
199 See 50 U.S.C. § 1705 (2018) (making it “unlawful” to violate any order issued pursuant to
the IEEPA, with penalties including imprisonment up to twenty years).
200 U.S. v. Ehsan, 163 F.3d 855, 856 (4th Cir. 1998).
201 Id. at 857. Ehsan was not a sympathetic defendant. He had attempted to order the product
(Transformer Oil Gas Analysis Systems) from a U.S. company for direct shipment to Iran. Id. The
U.S. company declined, because of the export ban. Id. So then Ehsan ordered that the product be
shipped to Dubai, with plans to send it to Iran. Id. U.S. customs agents learned about the deal, and
Ehsan was arrested by federal agents. Id.
202 Id. at 859; see also id. (“Ehsan insists that the government may not prosecute him for an
export to Iran when he reasonably could have thought he was engaged in reexportation.”).
203 Exec. Order No. 12,959, §1(b), 60 Fed. Reg. 24,757, 24,757 (May 6, 1995); see also id.
(prohibiting “the exportation from the United States to Iran . . . of any goods, technology (including
technical data . . . subject to the Export Administration Regulations . . . ), or services”).
204 Id. § 1(c), at 24,757; see id. (prohibiting “the reexportation to Iran . . . of any goods or
technology (including technical data or other information) exported from the United States, the
exportation of which to Iran is subject to [certain] export license application requirements”).
205 See Ehsan, 163 F.3d at 857 n.1 (agreeing that Ehsan’s product was “exempt from the
reexportation ban”).
206 That is true, for example, of the Department of Commerce’s Export Administrative
Regulations (EAR), which were issued pursuant to the Export Administration Act of 1979. See 15
C.F.R § 734.13(a)(1) (2020) (deﬁning “export” as “[a]n actual shipment or transmission out of the
United States”); 15 C.F.R. § 734.14(a)(3) (deﬁning “reexport” as “[a]n actual shipment or
transmission of an item subject to the EAR from one foreign country to another foreign country”).
Notably, Clinton’s order expressly referred to those regulations. See Exec. Order No. 12,959, §1(b),
60 Fed. Reg. at 24,757.
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United States to a country the President viewed as an international sponsor
of terrorism.207 But “reexportation” is a potentially trickier issue, because it
involves the passage of goods between two foreign countries.208 After
consultation with interested agencies (which would almost certainly have
included the State Department, Treasury Department, and National Security
Agency),209 the President might reasonably have opted to bar “reexportation”
in more limited circumstances. Accordingly, Ehsan had a strong argument
that he could export goods (from the United States to Dubai), and then
reexport them (from Dubai to Iran) without running afoul of the order.
The Ehsan court did not consider that possibility. Instead, the court
interpreted the Executive Order in accordance with what the court found to
be its “obvious purpose.”210 “[T]he Executive Order intended to cut oﬀ the
shipment of goods intended for Iran.”211 Because Ehsan’s goal was to “seek a
market in Iran,” his shipment constituted an “exportation” to Iran.212 That is,
the court interpreted the Executive Order so as to most eﬀectively carry out
its apparent purpose. But once we recognize that Presidents often issue
compromise orders, courts have good reason to hew closely to the limitations
embodied in the text.
In sum, I argue that courts should respect the President’s power to issue
a less-than-eﬀective order—and let the President correct any “mistakes”
himself. As it turns out, President Clinton did later revise the executive order
at issue in Ehsan to broaden the ban on reexportations.213 I return to the
importance of revised directives below.
207 Cf. Ehsan, 163 F.3d at 859 (ﬁnding that the President sought in part to “sanction[] Iran’s
sponsorship of international terrorism”).
208 See supra note 206 (citing sources deﬁning “reexportation” as the movement of goods from
one foreign country to another foreign country).
209 See Fonzone Interview, supra note 9 (noting the agencies consulted on national security
issues). Today, the list would also include the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), but DHS
did not exist in 1995. See Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–296, 116 Stat. 2135
(creating DHS).
210 Ehsan, 163 F.3d at 859.
211 Id.
212 Id. at 857-59. The court asserted that its interpretation was consistent with the text of the
directive. Throughout history, the court stated, “‘exportation’ has consistently meant the shipment
of goods to a foreign country with the intent to join those goods with the commerce of that country.”
Id. at 858. Under this view, the Executive Order barred the “exportation” of any goods headed
(ultimately) for Iran. Id. at 859. But throughout this analysis, the court failed to explain how this
deﬁnition might diﬀerentiate an “export” from a “reexport” to Iran.
213 The subsequent order would clearly have covered Ehsan’s conduct. See Exec. Order No.
13,059, § 2, 62 Fed. Reg. 44,531, 44,531 (Aug. 19, 1997) (prohibiting “the exportation,
reexportation . . . directly or indirectly, from the United States, or by a United States person . . . of
any goods . . . to Iran . . ., including the exportation, reexportation . . . undertaken with knowledge
or reason to know . . . such goods . . . are intended” for Iran).
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b. Toothless Directives
Presidents may also opt, after consultation, to issue directives that do very
little at all. Clinton’s executive order on children’s environmental health
illustrates this point. After agencies repeatedly expressed concerns about
lawsuits, and the extent to which the new directive might be in tension with
other commitments (like the legality of tobacco), Clinton decided to “ease
[the] burden a bit” and issued a watered-down directive.214 The ultimate order
instructed agencies to act only “to the extent permitted by law” and only as
“appropriate, and consistent with the agency’s mission . . . .”215
Some readers might think that Presidents always hedge their bets in
directives in order to stave off legal challenge, and thus always include qualifiers
like “to the extent permitted by law.” But that is not the case. For example, the
executive order in Ehsan (Clinton’s Executive Order 12,959) “prohibited . . . the
exportation” of certain products “from the United States to Iran,” without such
qualifiers.216 Likewise, President Trump’s second and third travel bans—which,
by all accounts, were subject to a more extensive consultation process than the
first217—“suspended” the entry of designated individuals.218 There was no
qualifying language attached to those suspensions.219
This analysis has important implications for recent litigation over
President Trump’s executive order on funding for sanctuary cities. One of the

Rudalevige, supra note 111, at 144; see supra subsection II.B.1.b.
Exec. Order 13,045, § 1, 62 Fed. Reg. 19,885, 19,885 (April 21, 1997).
Exec. Order No. 12,959, §1(b), 60 Fed. Reg. 24,757, 24,757 (May 6, 1995). There were
likewise no such qualiﬁers in the revised directive. See Exec. Order No. 13,059, § 2(a) 62 Fed. Reg.
44,531, 44,531 (Aug. 19, 1997).
217 See Steve Holland & Julia Edwards Ainsley, Trump Signs Revised Travel Ban in Bid to
Overcome Legal Challenges, REUTERS (March 6, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usaimmigration-exclusive/trump-signs-revised-travel-ban-in-bid-to-overcome-legal-challengesidUSKBN16D154 [https://perma.cc/588H-YD24] (reporting that Defense Secretary Jim Mattis
and other senior cabinet members provided input on the revised travel ban); see also W. Neil
Eggleston & Amanda Elbogen, The Trump Administration and the Breakdown of Intra-Executive
Legal Process, 127 YALE L.J.F. 825, 839 (2018) (“By all accounts, EO-3 appears to have gone
through at least some review . . . .”).
218 See Travel Ban Version Two, supra note 24, §2(c), at 13213 (suspending entry subject only to
speciﬁed limitations, waivers, and exceptions); see Travel Ban Version Three, supra note 25 §2, at
45165-67 (“The entry . . . of nationals of the following countries is hereby suspended and limited,
as follows, subject to categorical exceptions and case-by-case waivers . . . .”).
219 Notably, other provisions of the second travel ban contained the “to the extent permitted by
law” qualiﬁer. But the “suspension of entry” provision did not. See Travel Ban Version Two, supra
note 24, §6(d), at 13216 (“It is the policy of the executive branch that, to the extent permitted by law
and as practicable, State and local jurisdictions be granted a role in the process of ” refugee
resettlement (emphasis added)); id. § 9(b), at 13217 (“To the extent permitted by law and subject to the
availability of appropriations, the Secretary of State shall immediately expand the Consular Fellows
Program . . . .” (emphasis added)). The third travel ban contained no such qualiﬁer in any section.
214
215
216
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central questions is whether the order does anything at all.220 Executive Order
13,768 provides:
[T]he Attorney General and the Secretary [of DHS], in their discretion and to
the extent consistent with law, shall ensure that jurisdictions that willfully refuse
to comply with 8 U.S.C. 1373 (sanctuary jurisdictions) are not eligible to
receive Federal grants, except as deemed necessary for law enforcement
purposes by the Attorney General or the Secretary.221

The order further states that “[t]he Secretary has the authority to designate,
in his discretion and to the extent consistent with law, a jurisdiction as a sanctuary
jurisdiction.”222
Notably, this question of meaning is preliminary to the challenging
constitutional questions in the case. As the plaintiﬀ localities have argued, if
Executive Order 13,768 requires the Attorney General and DHS Secretary to
strip federal grants from localities, the President has arguably usurped
Congress’s power under the Spending Clause, thereby transgressing the
constitutional separation of powers, and commandeered localities in violation
of the federalism principles underlying the Tenth Amendment.223

220 Another issue was whether the Attorney General could “clarify” the order via
memorandum. See Memorandum from the Attorney General to All Department Grant-Making
Components 1 (May 22, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/968146/download
[https://perma.cc/M7MU-5N9P] (stating that Executive Order 13,768 only applies to “federal
grants administered by the Department of Justice or the Department of Homeland Security, and
not to other sources of federal funding”). For reasons discussed in connection with the first travel
ban, I do not believe that the Attorney General could contradict the plain text of the order. See
supra subsection III.B.1. Although the President can delegate some functions to high-level
officials by directive, the government has not suggested that the Attorney General sought to
exercise any such delegated power. See supra note 193. The more challenging question in these
cases is what the text means.
221 Exec. Order No. 13,768, § 9(a), 82 Fed. Reg. 8799, 8801 (Jan. 25, 2017) (emphasis added)
[hereinafter Sanctuary City Order]; see also id. at §2(c), 82 Fed. Reg. at 8799 (“It is the policy of the
executive branch to . . . [e]nsure that jurisdictions that fail to comply with applicable Federal law do
not receive Federal funds, except as mandated by law.”) (emphasis added). Under the statute, state
and local government entities may not prohibit their oﬃcials from sharing with federal oﬃcials
“information regarding the . . . immigration status” of an individual. 8 U.S.C. § 1373(a) (2018).
Notably, a federal court recently found the statute itself unconstitutional. See City of Philadelphia
v. Sessions, 309 F.Supp.3d 289, 329-31, 344-45 (E.D. Pa. 2018) (holding § 1373(a) and (b)
unconstitutional under the Tenth Amendment because it “unequivocally dictates what a state
legislature may and may not do”) (internal quotations omitted), aﬀ ’d in part, vacated in part sub nom.
on other grounds City of Philadelphia v. Att’y Gen., 916 F.3d 276 (3d Cir. 2019).
222 Sanctuary City Order, supra note 220, § 9(a), at 8801 (emphasis added).
223 See City and Cty. of S.F. v. Trump, 897 F.3d 1225, 1231, 1234-35 (9th Cir. 2018)
(concluding that the order violated separation of powers principles); Cty. of Santa Clara v.
Trump, 250 F. Supp. 3d 497, 507, 530-36 (N.D. Cal. 2017) (finding separation of powers,
federalism, and due process violations).
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That may be precisely why the Executive Order is couched in qualiﬁers.
As oﬃcials told me, during the interagency consultation process, agency
oﬃcials will often point out if a proposed directive seems to violate a federal
statute, regulation, or the U.S. Constitution. Likewise, OLC review is
focused on such questions of legality.224 Of course, we do not know that the
order went through much review; it was issued in the early days of the
Administration. Nonetheless, even a brief review could have uncovered these
troubling issues.
In a recent opinion on Executive Order 13,768, a Ninth Circuit majority
found it implausible that the President had issued a toothless directive. The
court declared that any such interpretation “strains credulity.”225 After all, the
court emphasized, “Section 9(a) orders ‘the Attorney General and the
Secretary’ to ‘ensure that [sanctuary jurisdictions] . . . are not eligible to
receive Federal grants . . . .”226 The court discounted the “as consistent with
law” qualiﬁers.227 A narrow reading, the court emphasized, would be at odds
with the “object and policy” of the order—as reﬂected in public statements
by the Administration.228 “The President himself stated that he would use
defunding as a ‘weapon’” against sanctuary cities, and the White House Press
Secretary reiterated that “President Trump would ‘make sure that . . .
counties and other institutions that remain sanctuary cities don’t get federal
government funding . . . .’”229
Dissenting, Judge Ferdinand Fernandez suggested that his colleagues had
too quickly “shunt[ed] aside” the “consistent with law” phrases in the
Executive Order.230 “[I]f there is ambiguity in certain parts of the Executive

See supra Section II.B.
S.F., 897 F.3d at 1238.
Id. at 1239. The court emphasized that Executive Order 13,768 exempted funds “deemed
necessary for law enforcement purposes” and concluded that the order must apply to—and
require the Attorney General and DHS Secretary to take away—all other funds from designated
“sanctuary cities.” Id.
227 See id. at 1239-40 (concluding that “the Executive Order unambiguously commands action”
and its “savings clause does not and cannot override its meaning”).
228 See id. at 1242-43 (“If we look beyond the text of the Executive Order, the Administration’s
position becomes considerably weaker.”).
229 Id. at 1243; see also Daniel Simon and Jesse Marx, Trump: Feds May Defund Calif. Over
Sanctuary-state
Push,
USA
TODAY
(Feb.
6,
2017,
6:35
PM),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2017/02/06/california-sanctuary-statetrump/97567378/ [https://perma.cc/8U4N-KYXV] (reporting that the President stated: “Well, it’s a
weapon. I don’t want to defund the state or a city.” but “[i]f they [are] going to have sanctuary cities,
we may have to do that. Certainly, that would be a weapon.”).
230 S.F., 897 F.3d at 1249-50 (Fernandez, J., dissenting); id. at 1249 (describing the qualiﬁers as
“short but clear and extraordinarily important wording in the Executive Order”); see also id. at 124748 (ﬁnding the localities’ claims to be unripe).
224
225
226
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Order, it is not at all ambiguous in its use of the restrictive language.”231 Judge
Fernandez insisted: “To brush those words aside as implausible, or
boilerplate, or even as words that would render the Executive Order
meaningless was just to say that the plain language of the Executive Order
should be ignored in favor of comments made dehors.”232
The litigation over Executive Order 13,768 illustrates the importance of
considering presidential directives as a distinct area of interpretive inquiry.
Although this Article does not aim to resolve all the issues in these cases, the
analysis here should oﬀer guidance on the question of meaning. First, once
we consider the interagency consultation process, it becomes quite plausible
that the President issued a directive that did not match his preferred
substantive policy. Although the President may have wanted to “use
defunding as a ‘weapon’” and hoped sanctuary cities would not “‘get federal
government funding,’”233 the directive he issued is far more muted. The
directive is couched in qualiﬁers, instructing the Attorney General and DHS
Secretary to act only “to the extent consistent with law.”234 Moreover, not all
presidential directives—including not all directives issued by the Trump
Administration—contain similar qualifying language.235 That fact alone
makes the “consistent with law” language in Executive Order 13,768 seem
more signiﬁcant.236
Finally, it is quite plausible that the President issued a largely toothless
directive. During the interagency consultation process, the President may
have been advised that, however much he might want to, he lacks the power
to defund localities. Notably, in that event, neither the Attorney General
nor the DHS Secretary could legitimately rely on the order to take away
federal grants.237 As Judge Fernandez put it, “whatever the President, or
others, might wish for in order to achieve what they deem to be a more

Id. at 1249-50.
Id. at 1249.
Supra note 229 and accompanying text.
Sanctuary City Order, supra note 220, § 9(a), at 8801.
See supra notes 218–19 and accompanying text.
Although one can debate the relevant context for purposes of textual analysis, this Article
assumes that context includes other presidential directives (at least those issued by the same
administration). See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
237 The Attorney General has sought to rely on other sources of legal authority to defund
sanctuary cities. But those eﬀorts have so far met with mixed results. Compare City of Chicago v.
Sessions, 888 F.3d 272, 283-87, 293 (7th Cir. 2018) (holding the Attorney General lacked statutory
authority); Philadelphia v. Attorney General, 916 F.3d 276, 279, 293 (3d Cir. 2019) (same), with State
v. Department of Justice, 951 F.3d 84, 90, 123-24 (2d Cir. 2020) (concluding that the Attorney
General had statutory authority to deny certain federal funds to localities that did not comply with
“three immigration-related conditions” and ﬁnding no Tenth Amendment violation).
231
232
233
234
235
236

922

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 168: 877

perfect polity,” the Executive Order seems to “recognize[] their limits in
achieving that.”238
C. The Institutional Setting of Presidential Directives
This Article has emphasized that any theory of interpreting presidential
directives must focus on both Article II and the institutional setting of the
presidency. A few features of that institutional setting buttress this Article’s
case for textualism. Indeed, textualism may have more appeal in this context
than it does in the statutory realm.
1. The Relevance of Publicly-Available Statements
As the sanctuary cities litigation illustrates, one question that courts face
is determining whether to rely on extratextual evidence to inform the
meaning of a presidential directive. I argue that the existence of the
interagency consultation process casts considerable doubt on the utility of
such evidence.
Notably, extratextual evidence is often not even available. Indeed,
presidential directives diﬀer from statutes and regulations in part because
there is typically no “executive history” or other administrative record.239 The
OMB does keep a ﬁle on executive orders and proclamations but generally
does not release those ﬁles until many years after a directive is issued (if at
all).240 And OMB likely has no information about the agency review process
for other directives. Accordingly, in most cases, a court will have no executive
history, even if it presumed that such materials might shed light on the
S.F., 897 F.3d at 1248 (Fernandez, J., dissenting).
“Each House shall keep a Journal of its Proceedings, and from time to time publish the
same . . . .” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 3. Although some jurists worried in the early-twentieth
century about the public availability of legislative history, there is no question that lawyers today
can access that material. See Nelson, supra note 75, at 367 (“[T]he most widely used kinds of
legislative history are [just as] available to the [public as] the statutory texts they purport to
explain.”).
240 See Rudalevige, supra note 111, at 147-48 (noting that as of his 2012 article, “some executive
order ﬁles [were] available up to late 1987”). Some materials may be accessible via a Freedom of
Information Act request, but such proceedings can be lengthy. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(f) (2018) (stating
that FOIA applies to the Executive Oﬃce of the President, which encompasses the OMB); see also
David E. Pozen, Freedom of Information Beyond the Freedom of Information Act, 165 U. PA. L. REV.
1097, 1135, 1140 (2017) (noting complaints by journalists that FOIA is “too sluggish, too diﬃcult to
navigate, and too limited in its substantive scope to be of much use”) Even if the materials were
available, much of the ﬁle would be of limited value, given that the President does not see the bulk
of the agency comments. The most valuable document would be the memo that the President
receives along with the text, providing an overview of the interagency debate. It is unclear whether
that document is typically in the OMB ﬁle. See Section II.B (describing the documents that go to
the President).
238
239
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interpretive inquiry. Although this Article does not rely heavily on the point,
the lack of executive history does provide a functional reason for courts to
adopt a textualist approach to presidential directives.
The more important question, in my view, is what courts should do with
the extratextual material that is available. After all, as the sanctuary cities
litigation illustrates, even if there is no “executive history,” a court may be
able to look at public statements by the White House press secretary or even
comments by the President himself.
I argue that the very existence of the interagency consultation process
casts doubt on the utility of such “outside comments” to discern the
meaning of a directive.241 The President may have an incentive to take a
strong stand in the public sphere, as when President Trump threatened to
“use defunding as a ‘weapon’” against sanctuary cities.242 Yet behind closed
doors, the discussions may look very different—as officials raise concerns
about the legality or wisdom of a proposed action. Ultimately, the President
may opt to sign a compromise or even toothless directive—one that does
not reflect his preferred substantive policy. Courts give effect to that
presidential decision by adhering to the text of the directive that the
President has designated as law.
2. Updating Directives
Statutory textualists “often respond to accusations that their
interpretations lead to unwise or unjust results by insisting that ‘if Congress
doesn’t like it, Congress can ﬁx it.’”243 But such arguments seem insensitive
to the very bicameralism and presentment process that textualists themselves
emphasize. Because of the veto gates of the statutory process, it may be very
challenging to amend a law in response to a judicial decision.244
By contrast, presidential directives appear to be easier to revise.245
Notably, two months after President Wilson granted the “blanket pardon” at

241 To be clear, this Article focuses on the meaning, not the validity, of presidential directives.
It is a separate question whether public statements by the President are relevant to an analysis of
constitutionally impermissible motive. See supra note 178.
242 Supra note 229 and accompanying text.
243 JOHN F. MANNING & MATTHEW C. STEPHENSON, LEGISLATION AND REGULATION
58 (2d ed. 2013).
244 See, e.g., Mark Seidenfeld, A Process Failure Theory of Statutory Interpretation, 56 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 467, 504-05 (2014) (doubting on this basis textualists’ “contention that legislatures
generally can cure misinterpretations by courts”).
245 Political scientist Sharece Thrower has shown that around half of the executive orders
issued between 1937 and 2013 have been modiﬁed in some way. See Sharece Thrower, To Revoke or
Not Revoke? The Political Determinants of Executive Order Longevity, 61 AM. J. POL. SCI. 642, 643-44
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issue in De Kay v. United States, he realized that he might have gone a bit
overboard and issued a clarifying proclamation.246 The new directive stated
that the pardon applied only to individuals whose sentences had been
“illegally suspended”—that is, those aﬀected by the Killits decision.247
Likewise, President Clinton closed the (apparent) loophole in Ehsan by
broadening the ban on “reexportations.”248 President Trump has revised his
travel ban twice.249
That is not to say that it is always easy to revise a presidential directive.
Presidents Reagan and George H.W. Bush utterly failed in their attempts to
revoke Lyndon Johnson’s Executive Order 11,246, which barred
discrimination and required aﬃrmative action by government contractors.250
As discussed, Presidents assume that revisions are subject to the same
interagency consultation process as initial orders; and sometimes that process
leads a President to issue no directive at all. Yet the complexity of the process
still pales in comparison to the veto gates of the bicameralism and
presentment process of Article I.251 Accordingly, to the extent a President
concludes that a court has erred in its understanding of a given directive, the
President can more readily respond.252 In short, some of the concerns with
textualism in the statutory context seem to be less pressing here.

(2017) (“Of the 6,158 executive orders issued between 1937 and 2013, 18% are amended, 8% are
superseded, and 25% are revoked.”).
246 Deﬁning Pardon and Amnesty Proclamation Dated June 14, 1917 (Aug. 21, 1917), in 17 A
COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 8318-19 (New York, Bureau
of National Literature, 1921).
247 See id. (stating that the pardon should apply “to no other[]” defendants); see also supra
Section I.B (discussing De Kay). It is unclear whether Wilson acted in response to the De Kay case.
248 See supra note 213 and accompanying text. It is unclear whether the Clinton Administration
was prompted by the Ehsan case.
249 See Travel Ban Version Two, supra note 24; Travel Ban Version Three, supra note 25.
250 See subsection II.B.1.b.
251 Cf. McNollgast, Positive Canons: The Role of Legislative Bargains in Statutory Interpretation, 80
GEO. L.J. 705, 707 & n.5 (1992) (noting the oversized role of congressional players who “control the
various veto gates”).
252 Notably, I have not found empirical work speciﬁcally addressing presidential overrides of
judicial decisions. Accordingly, I have no direct comparison to the literature on congressional
overrides. See, e.g., Matthew R. Christiansen & William N. Eskridge, Jr., Congressional Overrides of
Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 1967–2011, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1317, 1319-20 (2014)
(ﬁnding that the 1990s was “the golden age of overrides,” and “overrides declined . . . dramatically”
after 1998). Nevertheless, given the empirical work suggesting that Presidents often modify
directives (with or without a court decision), it seems quite plausible that Presidents would have an
easier time responding to judicial decisions. See supra note 245 (discussing recent political science
literature on presidential revocations of executive orders).
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IV. A SELF-IMPOSED CONSTRAINT ON PRESIDENTIAL POWER
The Opinions Clause of Article II empowers the President to seek out
advice from his subordinates—to invite them to help him ensure the faithful
execution of the laws. Since at least the 1930s, Presidents have exercised that
power to create a robust interagency consultation process for presidential
directives. Agency oﬃcials often spend weeks or months debating the legal
and policy details of the text. And at the end of this process, the President
may well opt for compromise. The federal judiciary, I argue, can best give
eﬀect to the structure the President has created under Article II—with its
potential for compromise and less-than-eﬀective policy—by adhering to the
text of a directive.
But this argument also has broader implications. Through the interagency
consultation process, Presidents have opted to place a constraint on their own
power. This Part ﬁrst explores why Presidents may have crafted such a check
and then suggests how the analysis here connects to theories of the
constitutional separation of powers.
A. Structural and Political Incentives
It may seem surprising that Presidents would, in effect, tie their own
hands through the process for issuing directives. But Presidents have
various structural and political incentives to rely on their subordinates.
First, as a practical matter, Presidents do not have time to draft (perhaps
any) directive. So they must rely on subordinates to do the writing. Second,
Presidents are generalists; they do not have expertise in the myriad areas in
which Presidents issue directives—ranging from proclaiming national
monuments,253 to overseeing government procurement contracts,254 to
barring financial transactions involving threatening foreign powers.255
Presidents thus rely on subordinates (often, from multiple agencies) who
have expertise in a given area.256

253 See Antiquities Act of 1906, Pub. L. No. 209, 34 Stat. 225 (codiﬁed at 54 U.S.C. § 320301(a)
(2018)) (providing that the President may declare historic landmarks on federal land).
254 See Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949, Pub. L. No. 81-152, 63 Stat.
377 (codiﬁed at 40 U.S.C. §§ 101, 121 (2018)) (together, providing that “[t]he President may prescribe
policies and directives” to ensure “an economical and eﬃcient” procurement system).
255 See International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), Pub. L. No. 95-223,
§§ 202, 203, 91 Stat. 1626, 1626-27 (Dec. 28, 1977) (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701, 1702) (providing
that the President may bar transactions with foreign countries that present “an unusual and
extraordinary threat”).
256 See Fonzone Interview, supra note 9 (stating that, with respect to both executive orders and
other directives, agencies “with expertise [are] consulted”).

926

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 168: 877

The Opinions Clause seems speciﬁcally designed to provide the President
with such expert advice. The Clause empowers the President to demand from
his “principal Oﬃcer[s]” a written opinion “upon any Subject relating to the
Duties of their respective Oﬃces”—that is, matters on which those oﬃcers
are more likely to have expertise.257 Moreover, the consultation among
agencies increases the level and amount of expertise—and may lead to better
policy (although that is by no means guaranteed).258 As Neal Katyal has
suggested, “[w]hen the State and Defense Departments have to convince each
other of why their view is right . . . better decision-making” may result.259
Third, the President may conclude that listening to his subordinates—and
respecting their wishes—will increase their willingness to implement
presidential policies. This point relates to a structural reality of the presidency:
“[T]he President alone and unaided [cannot] execute the laws. He must execute
them by the assistance of subordinates.”260 Although many theories of Article
II rest on the assumption that subordinates always do what the President says,
some political scientists have questioned that assumption.261
That research is still ongoing. For present purposes, it is enough that
the President himself may worry about implementation.262 In 2007, Clinton
complained that he was “frustrated” during his presidency because “I’d issue
all these executive orders” and could “never be 100 percent sure that they
257 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. As discussed, I assume that the President has discretion to
determine which “Subject[s]” relate to an oﬃcial’s duties. See supra note 94.
258 Interagency consultation does not ensure good decisions. Although one can debate what
qualiﬁes as a “good” decision, I suspect virtually everyone today would agree that Franklin
Roosevelt’s Executive Order 9066 falls outside that category. See Exec. Order No. 9066, 7 Fed. Reg.
1407, 1407 (Feb. 19, 1942) (authorizing the exclusion of “any person” from designated “military
areas”). The order led to the internment of over 110,000 persons of Japanese ancestry, including
70,000 U.S. citizens. See GREG ROBINSON, BY ORDER OF THE PRESIDENT: FDR AND THE
INTERNMENT OF JAPANESE AMERICANS 108-09 (2001). As Amanda Tyler recounts, when the
Roosevelt Administration debated the draft order, Attorney General Francis Biddle repeatedly
asserted that the federal government could not detain citizens, without a formal suspension of the
writ of habeas corpus. See AMANDA L. TYLER, HABEAS CORPUS IN WARTIME 224-27 (2017). But
the Attorney General lost that interagency battle and ultimately “capitulated.” Id. at 227; see also
supra notes 116–117 and accompanying text (describing how, from the 1930s on, executive orders were
reviewed by the Attorney General for “form and legality”).
259 Katyal, supra note 17, at 2317.
260 Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 117 (1926); see also Wilcox v. Jackson, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.)
498, 513 (1839) (“The President speaks and acts through the heads of the several departments . . . .”).
261 See Joshua B. Kennedy, “‘Do This! Do That!’ and Nothing Will Happen”: Executive Orders and
Bureaucratic Responsiveness, 43 AM. POL. RES. 59, 61 (2015) (ﬁnding that agencies “sometimes” obey
executive orders and that “the conditions under which agencies will forego responding to a
presidential directive are multi-faceted”); see also Rudalevige, supra note 111, at 157 (“If agencies are
told, ‘do this,’ do they ‘do that’? . . . . We don’t know, as yet.”).
262 Cf. William G. Howell, Unilateral Powers: A Brief Overview, 35 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q.
417, 433-36 (2005) (“All presidents . . . struggle to ensure that those who work below them will
faithfully follow orders.”).
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were implemented.”263 As Rudalevidge suggests, a President may conclude
that “[a]n agency that writes the orders . . . is surely more likely to carry
them out.”264
Finally, the President may rely on the interagency consultation process to
avoid embarrassing (and perhaps politically costly) mistakes. Several of the
oﬃcials I interviewed volunteered this point as the single most important
reason for a President to engage in consultation. As one oﬃcial put it, the
process not only constrains but also “protects the President.”265
B. A Diﬀerent Type of Check
Whatever the reason, it is clear that Presidents have invited subordinate
oﬃcials to play a key role in crafting presidential directives. And at the end
of this interagency consultation process, Presidents have issued directives that
do not fully advance the President’s preferred policy. Instead, the President
often opts to split the diﬀerence among agencies or substantially “soften” a
directive. In this way, the interagency consultation process serves as a
constraint on presidential power.
The process appears to be an example of what Katyal has dubbed the
“internal separation of powers.”266 Notably, Katyal has emphasized the role of
career civil servants. As he explains, the complex bureaucracy—replete with
government oﬃcials who serve from administration to administration—can
push back on “presidential adventurism.”267
The analysis here suggests a diﬀerent kind of internal check. Presidents
themselves have invited the constraint—and not primarily from career civil
263 Andrew Rudalevige, The Administrative Presidency and Bureaucratic Control: Implementing a
Research Agenda, 39 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 10, 18 (2009) (quoting Clinton’s statement).
264 Rudalevige, supra note 111, at 157. A few oﬃcials I interviewed found this view plausible.
See Bies Interview, supra note 9 (asserting that Presidents consult with agencies in part because “you
need ‘buy in’” from oﬃcials who will implement the directive); see also Egan Interview, supra note 9
(stating that agency oﬃcials would not likely “ﬂout” a presidential directive but might resist it by
stating the “document is ‘so ﬂawed’ that they can’t adhere in current form”).
265 Bies Interview, supra note 9 (asserting that the process “protects the President as much as
it does” any agency); Gray Interview, supra note 9 (stating that “if process weren’t followed, you can
have problems” and that can lead to “embarrassment” for the President).
266 See Katyal, supra note 17, at 2318 (“outlin[ing] a set of mechanisms that create checks and
balances within the executive branch”).
267 See id. at 2317-18 (“Much maligned by both the political left and right, bureaucracy creates
a civil service not beholden to any particular administration and a cadre of experts with a long-term
institutional worldview.”). Along similar lines, Jon Michaels has recently emphasized that the federal
bureaucracy may serve as a check on political appointees. See Jon D. Michaels, An Enduring, Evolving
Separation of Powers, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 515, 543-47 (2015) (detailing how the civil service has
“institutional, cultural, and legal incentives to insist that agency leaders follow the law . . . and
refrain from partisan excesses”).
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servants but rather from political appointees.268 The Opinions Clause, of
course, is focused on those “principal Oﬃcer[s],”269 and those oﬃcials seem
to have the most inﬂuence over the crafting of presidential directives. When
the President weighs in during the agency review process, he does so at the
request of a Cabinet member or other top oﬃcial.270 That should perhaps not
be surprising; a lower-level oﬃcial is far less likely to have the President’s ear.
And although many oﬃcials may be invited to comment on a directive, the
President hears primarily about the “high-level” views of, for example,
Cabinet members.271 As I have suggested, the President may be willing to
listen to these oﬃcials, in part because he selected these “principal Oﬃcer[s]”
for their positions.272 So when these oﬃcials disagree with one another, they
can at times push the President toward compromise.
Scholars have become increasingly interested in such subconstitutional
constraints on presidential power. That is in part because many
commentators have lost confidence in Congress’s capacity to serve as a
reliable “check,” at least when the House, Senate, and President are
controlled by the same political party.273 So scholars have suggested
alternative mechanisms for providing the “checks and balances” envisioned
by the Madisonian scheme of separated powers. For example, Eric Posner
and Adrian Vermeule have argued that politics and public opinion place
268 Notably, both Katyal and Jon Michaels are skeptical about the capacity of political
appointees to constrain presidential power. See Michaels, supra note 267, at 538-40 (“[T]here is
reason to expect agency leaders to promote their boss’s initiatives . . . .” rather than enforce statutory
directives); see also Katyal, supra note 17, at 2332-33 (expressing concern about the rising “number of
political actors in agencies” who serve for short periods and may lack the competence of career
bureaucrats). The analysis here suggests that political appointees can constrain presidential power
when the President invites the constraint.
269 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
270 See supra subsections II.B.1–2.
271 See supra subsections II.B.1–2.
272 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (“[The President] shall nominate, and by and with the
Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint . . . Oﬃcers of the United States”); see also supra
Section II.A.
273 See Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119 HARV. L.
REV. 2312, 2329 (2006) (“[W]hen government is uniﬁed . . . we should expect interbranch
competition to dissipate.”); accord Bruce Ackerman, The Living Constitution, 120 HARV. L. REV.
1737, 1809–10 n.222 (2007); Neal Devins & David E. Lewis, Not-So Independent Agencies: Party
Polarization and the Limits of Institutional Design, 88 B.U. L. REV. 459, 479 (2008). Some scholarship
has questioned the premises of the “separation of parties” critique. See JOSH CHAFETZ,
CONGRESS’S CONSTITUTION 28-35 (2017) (urging that each house of Congress does at times
protect its institutional interests, and also making the deeper point that cooperation during periods
of uniﬁed government may be “a feature of the American governing system, not a bug,” if it reﬂects
the wishes of the public); David Fontana & Aziz Z. Huq, Institutional Loyalties in Constitutional Law,
85 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 5 (2018) (“[T]he behavior of federal oﬃcials cannot always be explained simply
by partisan or ideological motives.”).
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important limits on what the President can do.274 Jack Goldsmith and
Gillian Metzger have argued that the President is constrained by a variety
of forces, including the other branches, the bureaucracy, and external groups
like the press, lawyers, and nonprofit organizations.275
This Article adds a “self-imposed” check to the mix. Through the
interagency consultation process, Presidents have placed a constraint on their
own unilateral action. Accordingly, presidential directives turn out to be less
unilateral than one might have anticipated—at least under the system
Presidents have developed since the 1930s.
C. The Contingency of the Interpretive Method
This ﬁnal point leads me to an important observation, which further
underscores the distinction between statutory and presidential textualism.
Many statutory textualists argue that their method derives from the
bicameralism and presentment process of Article I.276 Under that view,
statutory textualism is baked into the constitutional scheme.
The case for textualism in the context of presidential directives is
diﬀerent. Article II does not, standing alone, call for a textualist approach.
Instead, the case for textualism depends on the manner in which the President
has exercised his Article II power. The Opinions Clause invites the President
to seek out advice from his subordinates. Pursuant to that authority,
Presidents have created a complex scheme for issuing directives, relying on
agency oﬃcials to draft, redraft, and bargain over the content of directives.
At the end of this process, the President often opts for compromise among
competing agency views. Courts, I argue, best give eﬀect to that presidential
decision by hewing closely to the text.
Article II thus invites, but does not require, the President to create this
interagency consultation scheme.277 Nor does Article II demand that the
President opt for compromise. The existing scheme for crafting presidential
directives, like many other aspects of administrative governance, depends on

274 See ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, THE EXECUTIVE UNBOUND 4-5, 12-13
(2010) (stating that these constraints include elections, public approval ratings, and presidential
concerns about long-term legacy).
275 See JACK GOLDSMITH, POWER AND CONSTRAINT xi-xii, 209 (2012) (arguing that these
forces not only constrain the President but have also legitimated the growth in presidential power);
Gillian E. Metzger, The Supreme Court, 2016 Term—Foreword: 1930s Redux: The Administrative State
Under Siege, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1, 77-85 (2017) (noting that these constraints ensure “good
government” and serve “essential constitutional function[s]”).
276 See supra Section I.C.
277 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1 (“[The President] may require the Opinion, in writing”
of oﬃcials (emphasis added)); supra Section II.A.

930

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 168: 877

a mix of political incentives, norms, and conventions, rather than legal
requirements.278 Accordingly, in contrast to prominent theories of statutory
interpretation, this Article’s case for textualism is contingent.
This point underscores the extent to which interpretive theory turns on
both constitutional law and institutional setting. A signiﬁcant change in
institutional design may call for a diﬀerent interpretive approach.279 For now,
however, courts should recognize that Presidents have for a mix of reasons
opted to tie their own hands. Courts show respect for that presidentially
created scheme—with its potential for compromise and less-than-eﬀective
policy—by adhering to the text.
CONCLUSION
Theories of interpretation depend on both constitutional law and
institutional setting. For statutes, the focus is properly on Article I and the
other rules and procedures governing Congress. By contrast, for presidential
directives, the emphasis must be on Article II and the institutional
mechanisms of the presidency. This Article contends that both the
constitutional structure and that institutional setting point toward textualism.
But whether or not one accepts that conclusion, the theoretical point holds.
Any theory of interpreting presidential directives should begin with Article
II. Contrary to the assumption of federal courts for over a century,
presidential directives should not be treated just like statutes.

278 See supra Section IV.A (explaining why the President consults with officials); cf. Daphna
Renan, Presidential Norms and Article II, 131 HARV. L. REV. 2187, 2221-30 (2018) (describing a
“deliberative-presidency norm” that “requires a considered, fact-informed judgment in certain
decisional domains”); Adrian Vermeule, Conventions of Agency Independence, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1163,
1166-67 (2013) (emphasizing “the role of conventions in creating and protecting agency independence”).
279 A full exploration of this contingency issue is beyond the scope of this Article. As discussed,
there is good reason to assume that Presidents will—for a mix of practical and political reasons—
continue to rely on the interagency consultation process. See supra Section IV.A. If nothing else, it
can be politically costly for a President not to consult with multiple administrative oﬃcials about a
directive. Accordingly, this Article oﬀers an interpretive theory that builds on the existing
institutional structure. But I ﬂag this contingency issue for a few reasons. First, I want to stress an
important distinction between statutory textualism and presidential textualism. Second, I wish to
call attention to an issue that seems to be worth further examination. Scholars may wish to consider,
for example, whether and the extent to which other interpretive theories are contingent on certain
institutional arrangements.

